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Greene v. Seattle City Light12/20/1999
the Civil Service Commission did not address Greene's discrimination claims, it would be unjust to bar those claims on the basis of the issues that were before the Commission.
To determine whether the decision of an administrative tribunal has preclusive effect, Washington courts use the following three criteria: (1) whether the agency acting within its competence made a factual decision; (2) agency and court procedural differences; and (3) policy considerations. As City Light concedes, the Civil Service Commission is not competent to adjudicate discrimination claims under RCW 49.60. Thus, the first criterion is not met. Greene contends that the second and third criteria are likewise not met. He argues generally that the "hearing examiner was ill-equipped to enforce the legal {and} procedural safeguards essential in proving a claim of race discrimination." But the second criteria is more narrowly focused on the procedural protections that must be afforded the parties in any quasi-judicial proceeding. For example, the administrative decision makers must be competent, and the parties must be afforded the right to obtain counsel, to present arguments, to call witnesses on their own behalf and to cross-examine the opposing party's witnesses. It is undisputed that Greene was afforded these procedural protections in the proceedings before the Civil Service Commission.
Finally, Greene argues that the clear policy of RCW 49.60 is that only "a court of competent jurisdiction" will hear claims brought pursuant to the chapter. Because the Civil Service Commission does not have authority to adjudicate RCW 49.60 discrimination claims, it follows that policy considerations weigh against using a Commission decision to bar such a claim.
Relying principally on Stevens v. City of Centralia, City Light nonetheless argues that Greene's claim is barred. There, Stevens challenged his discharge from Centralia City Light to an arbitrator pursuant to the grievance procedures in the union agreement. The arbitrator found that Centralia City Light had good cause to terminate Stevens' employment. When Stevens sought damages for discrimination under RCW 49.60, the trial court gave collateral estoppel effect to the arbitrator's finding of good cause. The court nonetheless did not dismiss Stevens' discrimination claim, concluding that he "could still state viable discrimination and retaliation claims." On appeal, Stevens failed to assign error to the trial court's collateral estoppel ruling and thus waived any argument that the administrative findings should not bar his claim. Because this court did not address whether collateral estoppel applies to administrative findings, Stevens clearly does not stand for the proposition that Greene is bound by the Civil Service Commission's decisions.
We conclude that Greene's claims are not barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel and proceed to the merits of those claims.
Racial Discrimination
Greene argues that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing his racial discrimination claim. We agree.
Washington's law against discrimination, codified at RCW 49.60, protects employees from racial discrimination. The statute provides in part:
It is an unfair practice for any employer . . . {t}o discriminate against any person in compensation or in other terms or conditions of employment because of age, sex, marital status, race, creed, color, national origin, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability.
Because our discrimination laws substantially parallel Title VII, we may look to federal law for non-binding guidance.
To establish a pr
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