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Greene v. Seattle City Light12/20/1999
tions in four respects: (1) subject matter; (2) cause of action; (3) persons and parties; and (4) the quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is made. Res judicata should not be applied when it would work an injustice. Unlike collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, the doctrine of res judicata bars not only issues that were actually raised and litigated, but those that might have been.
In January 1999, after Greene's civil service hearing, our Supreme Court addressed the issue whether res judicata bars a subsequent action on an issue already decided by a civil service commission. In Kelso, the court held that the cause of action before the Commission was not identical to the subsequent arbitration action because they "involved the consideration of different evidence and adjudicated the infringement of different rights." Determinative to the court were the different legal standards involved in the different actions. Under the applicable Kelso civil service ordinance, the civil service hearing evaluated whether the police officer's suspension was "'in good faith and for cause.'" In contrast, the arbitrator in the subsequent action evaluated whether there was "'just cause'" for the suspension, the standard set forth in the collective bargaining agreement.
The court explained that a finding of "good faith and for cause" was not consistent with the "just cause" standard, since the latter is a term of art with a precise legal definition. Although the two actions addressed the same issue of whether the officer's suspension was proper, they were not identical for the purpose of res judicata.
Kelso controls here. The prior administrative proceedings are not identical to the action before us. Although both of the administrative proceedings examined the propriety of Greene's demotion and discharge, the legal standards in those proceedings are different than in this action. In the civil service hearing, the commissioner evaluated whether City Light had "just cause" for terminating Greene's employment. In contrast, the court in a discrimination action must determine whether there was a discriminatory purpose for the termination or discipline, despite a legitimate purpose that may exist.
As in Kelso, the evidence being considered and the rights being adjudicated are different in the civil service hearing and the discrimination action. Thus, the two causes of action are not identical, and res judicata does not apply.
City Light also argues that Greene is collaterally estopped from arguing that his demotion and discharge were for anything other than "just cause." The party asserting collateral estoppel must show that (1) the issue in both actions is identical, (2) the prior adjudication ended in a final judgment on the merits, (3) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party in the prior action, and (4) applying the doctrine would not work an injustice.
Here, the second and third collateral estoppel criteria are met: the Commission issued a final decision after considering the merits of Greene's appeal, and Greene was a party to the earlier action.
The first criterion, however, is not satisfied. The Civil Service Commission examined the basis for Greene's demotion and discharge and concluded that both were for "just cause." In a discrimination action under RCW 49.60, the circumstances of the demotion and discharge would likewise be at issue. But, the mere fact that a legitimate reason existed for the disciplinary action does not resolve the question of whether Greene was subject to racial or disability discrimination. Likewise, the fourth criterion, that the doctrine not work an injustice, is not met. Because
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