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Greene v. Seattle City Light12/20/1999
UNPUBLISHED
At issue is whether the trial court properly dismissed on summary judgment Joe Greene's claims against Seattle City Light based on alleged violations of Washington's law against discrimination. Because there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to Greene's racial discrimination, retaliation, and disability discrimination claims, we reverse the summary judgment order.
Greene worked for Seattle City Light for more than a decade. But in 1994, City Light terminated his employment. Several months before his discharge, City Light demoted Greene from crew chief to lineworker for safety violations.
Shocked by his demotion, Greene left the jobsite. He went to the doctor the following day for high blood pressure and remained home for several months. Greene's physician completed certain medical forms designated by City Light, which Greene submitted. After exhausting his vacation and sick leave, Greene failed to return to work. Asserting that Greene did not properly request authorized leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), City Light terminated his employment.
Greene challenged his demotion and discharge before the Civil Service Commission. The commissioner found that City Light had "just cause" for both disciplinary actions. Greene then filed a complaint with the Washington State Human Rights Commission, alleging racial discrimination in his termination. The Human Rights Commission issued a "no reasonable cause" finding in its investigative report. On the basis of the Human Rights Commission's findings, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission determined that Greene had not established any violations of federal anti-discrimination laws.
Greene then brought this action, alleging three causes of action under RCW 49.60: racial discrimination, disability discrimination, and unlawful retaliation. Greene also made other claims that he has not pursued on appeal. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of City Light on all of Greene's claims and denied Greene's motion for reconsideration. Greene appeals only the dismissal of the claims under RCW 49.60. We may affirm an order granting summary judgment if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We consider all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. We review questions of law de novo.
The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of showing the absence of a dispute as to any issue of material fact. Once that burden is met, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish the existence of an element essential to the claim. An employee alleging discrimination in the workplace cannot rely on opinion or conclusory statements to overcome an employer's motion for summary judgment. Rather, the employee must establish specific and material facts to support each element of the prima facie case. We note that summary judgment should rarely be granted in employment discrimination cases.
Collateral Estoppel and Res Judicata
City Light first argues that Greene is bound by the Civil Service Commission's decisions that he was demoted and discharged for just cause. It contends that res judicata and collateral estoppel bar Greene from arguing in this action that his demotion and discharge were for anything other than just cause.
Res judicata and collateral estoppel prevent the relitigation of claims or issues between identical parties. The party asserting these defenses bears the burden of proof. To prove res judicata, the party asserting it must show concurrence of identity between the two ac
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