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Brown v. Scott Paper Worldwide Co.12/13/1999
t, on balance, of sufficient public benefit to offset the burden. Griffin, 130 Wn.2d at 68 (citation omitted).
Thus, it would appear that the Legislature's rational basis for the eight-employee threshold may have been to protect small employers. Such purpose would not be furthered by providing protection from law suits to managers or other individual employees "acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly," who are employed by large corporations such as Scott Paper.
The managers argue, nevertheless, that the Legislature did not intend to extend the right of private action against managers or other individual employees who may commit unfair practices, even if they are acting in the interest of an employer directly or indirectly, because the act as a whole is directed at employers as entities, who may in turn be liable for the acts of their managers and individual employees if they know or should have known of the unfair practice and do not take prompt and reasonable steps to remedy the problem. We agree that the act must be considered as a whole, to ensure that all parts of the statutory scheme operate in harmony with judicial construction of any given ambiguous provision. See, e.g., State v. Malone, 106 Wn.2d 607, 610-11, 724 P.2d 364 (1986); Whatcom County v. City of Bellingham, 128 Wn.2d 537, 546, 909 P.2d 1303 (1996). We also agree that in the appropriate circumstances the act provides liability for employers for the acts of managers and other individual employees. But contrary to the managers' argument, the act specifically provides for liability of "persons" who do not fit the definition of "employer" but who "aid, abet, encourage, or incite the commission of any unfair practice, or {who} attempt to obstruct or prevent any other person from complying with the provisions of {Ch. 49.60} or any order issued thereunder." RCW 49.60.220. It would be a strange construction of the act for the court to conclude that managers who are acting in the interest of an employer directly or indirectly and who, thus, are included as employers under RCW 49.60.040(3), nevertheless cannot be held individually liable for their own acts except by an aiding and abetting theory under RCW 49.60.220.
In any event, subsection .220 illustrates that the Legislature did not intend to preclude individual liability of managers and other individual employees for their own acts. Although Brown did not sue the managers on an aiding and abetting theory, we deem this to be irrelevant, in light of the definition of "employer" contained in the act, and in light of the managers' concession in their responsive brief for this appeal that they were at all relevant times employed by Scott Paper as managers and at all relevant times acted as agents for Scott Paper. See Respondents' Brief at 1-2.
In sum, the trial court erred in dismissing Brown's claims for sexual discrimination and sexual harassment against the managers on the ground that Washington law permits recovery, if at all, only against Scott Paper and not against its managers "acting in the interest of {Scott Paper}, directly or indirectly" as provided by RCW 49.60.040(3). Such managers may be sued individually for their own acts in violation of RCW 49.60.
II.
The managers contend that even if the trial court erred in ruling that they could not be sued individually, the jury verdict finding Scott Paper not liable for sexual discrimination and harassment precludes Brown's identical claims against the managers individually. Specifically, the managers argue that "{b}ecause Scott Paper can only act through its employees, and has vicarious liability for its employees' acts, the ju
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