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Cooper v. Texas Wesleyan University12/15/1999
Steven M. Cooper appeals the trial court's granting Texas Wesleyan University's motion for summary judgment. Appellant brings three issues questioning:
(1) whether he filed an administrative complaint under the state Commission on Human Rights Act (CHRA); (2) whether he stated a claim for retaliation under the CHRA; and (3) whether he raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether appellee breached its contract with him by failing to follow its policies and procedures in denying him tenure. We resolve the issues against appellant and affirm the trial court's judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Appellant was employed in 1992 by the University as an associate professor in its Law School. During the 1994-95 academic year, appellant applied for tenure, but he withdrew his application before the Law School Tenure Committee voted. Appellant applied for tenure again in the 1995-96 academic year, and the Law School Tenure Committee voted not to grant him tenure. Appellant appealed the Law School Tenure Committee's decision to the University's Tenure and Academic Freedom Committee, which also voted not to grant appellant tenure. Appellant notified the University that he believed it breached its contract with him by not following the proper procedures in denying him tenure.
After denying appellant tenure, the University presented appellant with a contract for the term of August 1996 through May 1997. The contract provided that it was a "non-renewable, terminal contract." Appellant refused to sign the contract. On September 30, 1996, the University's attorney sent appellant's attorney a letter stating that, notwithstanding appellant's refusal to sign the contract, the University considered appellant an employee under the contract so long as he continued to teach during the term. Appellant's paychecks for September 1996 through April 1997 contained a restrictive endorsement stating that by endorsing the check, appellant agreed to the terms of his employment with the University. Appellant refused to endorse his paychecks and filed an application with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) asserting that the University was in violation of Title VII by retaliating against him because of his religion and ethnicity. The EEOC reviewed appellant's complaint and evidence and concluded there was insufficient evidence to proceed with an investigation. The EEOC gave appellant permission to sue.
Appellant sued the University for violations of the CHRA and breach of contract. The University moved for summary judgment asserting that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over appellant's CHRA claims because he did not exhaust his administrative remedies under the CHRA. The University also asserted that appellant did not state a valid claim under the CHRA because it did not take any adverse, retaliatory employment action against him. The University also argued that no evidence supported appellant's breach of contract claim because no evidence shows appellant would have received tenure even if all procedures had been followed. The trial court granted the University's motion for summary judgment without specifying the grounds for its ruling.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The function of a summary judgment is not to deprive a litigant of its right to a full hearing on the merits of any real issue of fact but is to eliminate patently unmeritorious claims and untenable defenses. See Gulbenkian v. Penn, 151 Tex. 412, 416, 252 S.W.2d 929, 931 (1952). The standards for reviewing a motion for summary judgment under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c) are:
1.
The movant for summary judgment has the burden of sho
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