In re Galvez12/13/1999
ining a livelihood, while doing as little injury as possible to the creditor." Krieg v. Fellows, 21 Nev. 307, 310, 30 P. 994, 995 (1892).
With regard to the scope of NRS 21.090, the debtors ask this court to broadly define "exempted earnings" as those wages earned through personal services, regardless whether these wages were periodic, were earned by an independent contractor, or were an account payable. We cannot interpret NRS 21.090 in this manner because it is clear from our analysis that NRS 21.090 only exempts periodic payments of earnings.
Statutory construction is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. State, Dep't of Mtr. Vehicles v. Lovett, 110 Nev. 473, 476, 874 P.2d 1247, 1249 (1994). If statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this court has held that it will not go beyond its literal meaning. Maxwell v. SIIS, 109 Nev. 327, 330, 849 P.2d 267, 270 (1993). However, if statutory language is ambiguous, the meaning of the words used in the statute may be discerned by examining the legislature's intent. Rodgers v. Rodgers, 110 Nev. 1370, 1373, 887 P.2d 269, 271 (1994).
Although the definition of "earnings" is not further defined in NRS 21.090 or in an accompanying Nevada statute, we have looked to the Consumer Credit Protection Act ("CCPA"), for guidance see 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (1998), as the Nevada Legislature amended NRS 21.090 in 1969 to conform to the CCPA. See Hearing on A.B. 349 Before the Judiciary Comm., 55th Leg. (Nev., April 9, 1969); see also Securities Investment Co. v. Donnelley, 89 Nev. 341, 347 n.6, 513 P.2d 1238, 1242 n.6 (1973) (noting that "the courts of the adopting state shall usually follow the construction placed on the statute in the jurisdiction of its inception").
The CCPA defines "earnings" as "compensation paid or payable for personal services, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus or otherwise, and includes periodic payments pursuant to a pension or retirement program." 15 U.S.C. § 1672(a) (1998). The CCPA further defines "disposable earnings" as "that part of the earnings of any individual remaining after the deduction from those earnings of any amounts required by law to be withheld." 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b) (1998).
In interpreting the aforementioned statutes, the United States Supreme Court has held that the wage garnishment exemption only exempts periodic payments of compensation and does not apply to every asset traceable in some form to such compensation. See Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 651 (1974); accord Pallante v. International Venture Inv., 622 F. Supp. 667, 669 (N.D. Ohio 1985); Fisher Body v. Lincoln Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 563 N.E.2d 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). In so doing, the Court reasoned that:
"The Congress did not enact the [CCPA] in a vacuum.
An examination of the legislative history of the [CCPA] makes it clear that, while it was enacted against the background of the Bankruptcy Act, it was not intended to alter the clear purpose of the latter Act to assemble, once a bankruptcy petition is filed, all of the debtor's assets for the benefit of the creditors.
There is every indication that Congress, in an effort to avoid the necessity of bankruptcy , sought to regulate garnishment in its usual sense as a levy on periodic payments of compensation needed to support the wage earner and his family on a week-to-week, month-to-month basis. There is no indication, however, that Congress intended to alter the delicate balance of a debtor's protections and obligations during the bankruptcy procedure." 417 U.S. at 651 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
We consider this reasoning compelling, as it attempts to balance the
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