 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Griffin v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole8/3/2000
of his employment. The claimant filed a petition to reinstate benefits. On appeal, we affirmed the referee's award reinstating the claimant's benefits on the basis that there was substantial evidence to support a finding that the claimant suffered a recurrence of his work-related injury.
"The purpose of the Act is to provide important public safety personnel with full compensation while disabled from an injury which occurs in the performance of duty." Feineigle v. Pennsylvania State Police, 680 A.2d 1220, 1222 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996) (quoting Colyer v. Pennsylvania State Police, 644 A.2d 230, 233 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994)). Similarly, the Workers' Compensation Act was intended to provide benefits to employees that suffer work-related injuries resulting in a loss of earnings. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 437 A.2d 92 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981).
The statutes differ in that the Act is to compensate an injured employee only for temporary disability, whereas the Workers' Compensation Act is to compensate an injured employee for wage-loss as long as he suffers a loss of earning power, whether it is temporary or permanent. In other words, the Act provides compensation only where the disability is temporary and does not apply where the disability is permanent. Coyler.
Although we recognize that the Act is to be strictly construed, which is contrary to the liberal construction afforded the Workers' Compensation Act, we cannot conclude that the General Assembly's use of the phrase "in the performance of his duties" was intended to preclude an individual from receiving benefits where he suffers a recurrence or aggravation of a prior work-related injury in a non-work related incident. To hold otherwise would shield the employer from liability where it is established through competent medical testimony that a subsequent injury is the direct result of a prior work-related injury, and would, in effect, be contrary to the purposes of the Act. Thus, we conclude that the hearing examiner erred in determining that Griffin was not entitled to benefits based solely on the hearing examiner's finding that Griffin was not in furtherance of his duties as a parole agent at the time of his injury.
This conclusion, however, is not dispositive of the present matter. In Finding of Fact No. 9, the hearing examiner found that " n August 24, 1995, [Griffin] was scheduled to work until 5:00 p.m. but, without permission, drove home, arriving at 4:00 p.m., at which time he injured his back." (F.F. No. 9) The hearing examiner further noted in Findings of Fact Nos. 18 and 23 that Dr. DeCarlo diagnosed Griffin as suffering from an "acute lumbosacral sprain and aggravation of the previous injury and the possibility of herniation or a ruptured disc" and that Dr. Leatherwood diagnosed Griffin as suffering from a "sprain/strain of the lumbosacral spine and degenerative disc disease." (F.F. Nos. 18 and 23) In addition, the hearing examiner acknowledged that Dr. Leatherwood ordered a MRI, which confirmed Dr. Leatherwood's conclusion that Griffin had sustained a work-related sprain or strain with no permanent injuries. (F.F. No. 23) Dr. Leatherwood was not asked whether Griffin's August 24, 1995 injury was a new injury or a recurrence or aggravation of the prior 1993 work-related injury.
A reading of the hearing examiner's discussion establishes that he recommended denying benefits solely on the basis that Griffin was not performing his duties as a parole officer at the time that he was injured. The hearing examiner failed to make a finding as to whether Griffin suffered a new injury on August 24, 1995, an aggravation or recurrence of his 1993 injury, or no injury.
Since the sta
Page 1 2 3 4 5 Pennsylvania Employee Leasing Services
Employee Leasing Services
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|