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Saville v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board8/7/2000
e, insufficient as a matter of law to carry employer's burden with respect to the termination of workers' compensation benefits? See Claimant's Brief at p. 3. Essentially, Claimant is arguing that there is not substantial evidence to support a termination of Claimant's benefits because the testimony of Employer's medical expert was equivocal and therefore incompetent and thus could not constitute substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Bethenergy Mines v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Skirpan), 531 Pa. 287, 612 A.2d 434 (1992). Additionally, in performing a substantial evidence analysis, this court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the party who prevailed before the factfinder. Birmingham Fire Ins. Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Kennedy), 657 A.2d 96 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995).
Moreover, we are to draw all reasonable inferences which are deducible from the evidence in support of the factfinder's decision in favor of that prevailing party. Lehigh County Vo-Tech School v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Wolfe), 539 Pa. 322, 652 A.2d 797 (1995). Furthermore, in a substantial evidence analysis utilized where both parties present evidence, it does not matter that there is evidence in the record which supports a factual finding contrary to that made by the WCJ, rather, the pertinent inquiry is whether there is any evidence which supports the WCJ's factual finding. Grabish v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Trueform Foundations), 453 A.2d 710 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1982). It is solely for the WCJ, as the factfinder, to assess credibility and to resolve conflicts in the evidence. Bethenergy Mines. In addition, it is solely for the WCJ, as the factfinder, to determine what weight to give to any evidence. Dana v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Hollywood), 706 A.2d 396 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998), allocatur denied, 556 Pa. 696, 727 A.2d 1123 (1998). As such, the WCJ may reject the testimony of any witness in whole or in part, even if that testimony is uncontradicted. Id. It is with these principles in mind that we consider this challenge.
Here, Claimant is alleging that the testimony of Dr. Resnick, Employer's expert, is equivocal, though more precisely, legally incompetent because it fails to meet the legal test clarified in Udvari.
Claimant argues that the rule of Udvari states that where an individual is experiencing subjective complaints of pain but there are no objective findings to support the subjective complaints, an employer's expert must testify that claimant is fully recovered and can return to work without restrictions. Udvari, 550 Pa. at 327, 705 A.2d at 1293. Claimant points to the following evidence as causing the testimony of employer's expert, Dr. Resnick, to be insufficient to meet this test. Employer's expert testified on direct examination as follows:
Q. Doctor, were you able to reach an opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty as to whether Mr. Saville was capable of returning to work?
A. Yes. My opinion was that he could return to work, but that it would be modified work. Not unrestricted heavy laboring work, but modified work.
Q. Doctor, did you impose any restrictions on Mr. Saville's ability to return to work specifically as a result of what you believe to be any residuals from the December 1993 work-related accident or injury?
A. No. I would not have placed any restriction with regard to the accident itself.
Q. What was the basis of your concluding that Mr. Saville could return to some type of work in a modified or restricted capacity?
A. The basi
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