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Richards v. Santini-Diaz8/3/2000
s returned to and accepted by her insurance carrier nor, apparently, that receipt of the carrier's check was not contingent upon execution of releases or a satisfaction of judgment. We understand the holding in Blodgett v. Blodgett (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 243, 551 N.E.2d 1249, where the wife executed a satisfaction of judgment in order to receive and utilize over $2,000,000 from an escrow account but sought to continue her appeal on the basis that she was under financial duress. We do not agree, however, that under the facts of this case the judge was without jurisdiction to rule on a post-trial motion and Santini offers us no authority to support her position. Because there is no evidence that Richards accepted Santini's check as satisfaction of all or any portion of the judgment and her lawyer returned the money from an insurance company check he cashed, we find this assignment of error without merit.
Santini's remaining assignment of error states:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ERRED BY IMPROPERLY ORDERING A NEW TRIAL PURSUANT TO CIV.R. 59.
Santini criticizes both the method and the substance of the order granting a new trial on three issues. She first claims the judge failed to sufficiently identify the grounds upon which the new trial is granted. Civ.R. 59 does require a judge to specify the grounds upon which the new trial is granted because he has the ability to overturn a jury verdict, and his ruling in that regard is reviewed only under an abuse of discretion standard. Civ.R. 59; Antal v. Olde Worlde Products, Inc. (1984), 9 Ohio St.3d 144, 146, 459 N.E.2d 223, 226. The judge is required to state the basis for his ruling to ensure meaningful review on appeal. hen the trial court offers no reasons for its decision, the court of appeals practically must defer to the trial court's conclusion that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Id.
While the judge's order in this case was brief, and in other circumstancesmight justify a remand to obtain a more thorough set of reasons, we find that the record amply indicates the reasons for the grant of a new trial here. The references to passion or prejudice under Civ.R. 59(A)(4), and to the weight of the evidence under Civ.R. 59(A)(6) find support in the same set of facts evident in the record, and require no special direction for discovery. Therefore, whether Antal's requirements are satisfied in any given case depends on the specific facts of that case; so long as the record is clear enough to provide meaningful review, there is no reason to order a remand for the judge to state reasons that are already apparent. On the record here and on the judge's ruling we can easily determine that the grant of a new trial was within his discretion; the result was not so palpably and grossly violative of fact or logic that it evidences not the exercise of will but the perversity of will, not the exercise of judgment but the defiance of judgment, not the exercise of reason but instead passion or bias. Nakoff v. Fairview Gen. Hosp. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 254, 256, 662 N.E.2d 1, 3.
Santini next suggests that the judge invaded the province of the jury by finding, in the face of conflicting, competent and credible evidence, that Richards was not compensated for her medical expenses, lost wages, and pain and suffering. As Richards presented claims for medical bills and lost wages greatly in excess of the verdict in addition to testimony on her pain, suffering and loss of enjoyment of life, the jury's verdict appears illogical particularly in light of the fact that Santini did not challenge any specific medical charge. Even Dr. Corn, while he opined that some of Richards' medical care was unwarranted, s
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