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Pytlinski v. Brocar Products8/18/2000
DECISION
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
On February 8, 1999, the plaintiff-appellant, Larry Pytlinski, filed a complaint alleging that he had been discharged from his employment by the defendants-appellees, Brocar Products, Inc., and John Helmsderfer, its president and owner, in retaliation for beliefs expressed in a memorandum stating that violations of standards established by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) had been occurring in the workplace.
Pytlinski's employment had begun on March 24, 1997, and his memorandum to Helmsderfer, dated February 5, 1998, centered upon the use of what Pytlinski described as "toxic paints and chemicals," especially from spray painters, which adversely affected his and others' health. Those conditions had prompted him to make complaints directly to OSHA expressing his employer's lack of concern for the health and safety of the company's employees. On February 6, 1998, Pytlinski's employment was terminated.
In his complaint, Pytlinski specified that a public policy exists in the state of Ohio that prohibits the termination of employees because they have complained about certain violations of the law, including OSHA violations. The complaint also alleged that allowing Pytlinski's discharge would place Ohio's public policy in jeopardy, and that, in terminating Pytlinski's employment, Brocar and Helmsderfer had violated that public policy.
Brocar and Helmsderfer answered the complaint, and on October 19, 1999, they filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) on the ground that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The memorandum in support of their motion advanced the thesis that Pytlinski's claim was barred by the Ohio statute of limitations governing a wrongful-discharge claim based on public policy, one that they argued to be one hundred eighty days. Pytlinski's response was that his complaint did not allege a violation of R.C. 4113.52, viz., the "Whistleblower Statute," and that therefore, the applicable statute of limitations was the four-year period established by R.C. 2305.09(D).
The court entertained oral argument on the motion on November 30, 1999, and granted it on December 9, 1999, in an order dismissing the complaint with prejudice. Pytlinski filed his appeal from that order on January 10, 2000, and his singular assignment of error that the court erred in making its order is premised on the following argument:
In an action for wrongful discharge predicated on a violation of Ohio Public Policy and not R.C. 4113.52, it is contrary to law to enter a judgment in favor of the defendants on the basis that the plaintiff has failed to institute his action within 180 days of the date of discharge.
Pytlinski acknowledges that his complaint was filed a year and two days after the date of his discharge. To substantiate his premise, he cites a decision of the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, Painter v. Graley (1992), 84 Ohio App.3d 65, 616 N.E.2d 285, which holds that the applicable statute of limitations for tortious wrongful-discharge actions is found in R.C. 2305.09(D), a general or residual statute for personal-injury actions. That limitations period is four years.
In Painter, the chief deputy clerk of a municipal court was terminated after she became a candidate for elected public office. Ultimately, she brought an action against her superior for tortious wrongful discharge. The trial court granted summary judgment in her favor, but that judgment was reversed by the court of appeals. When the Supreme Court of Ohio ultimately reviewed the case, the question of which statute of limi
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