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Cek v. Rdoht8/4/2000
he trial court effectively decided to split the difference by awarding prejudgment interest dating back to September 22, 1997, rather than the date of the accident on November 14, 1995. In this way, each party essentially got "half of a loaf" so to speak. Although appellant was ordered to pay some prejudgment interest, she was not compelled to pay interest from the date the cause of action accrued as required by the statute. Likewise, although appellee did not receive prejudgment interest from the day of the accident, he garnered at least some interest when the trial court had the discretion to deny the motion entirely.
The trial court ostensibly recognized that the decision as to when an award of prejudgment interest should begin to run is not discretionary, and such interest, if awarded, had to be calculated from the date the cause of action accrued. Despite this, the trial court deviated from the statute by selecting September 22, 1997 as the date upon which prejudgment interest began to run in the instant matter. In doing so, the trial court essentially acknowledged that it was avoiding the "good faith" analysis required by R.C. 1343.03(C). Indeed, the trial court stated:
"And I don't believe that's in conformance with statute and I believe I can get reversed by either side in this case. And if it comes back, I will make a decision at that time [regarding the good faith settlement efforts of the respective parties]. Unless the Court of Appeals decides to make that decision for me."
Although we appreciate the invitation, this court declines to resolve the good faith determinations required by R.C. 1343.03(C). The trial court is in a better position to adjudge whether appellant failed to make a good faith effort to settle the case and whether appellee did not fail to make a similar good faith effort to settle the dispute prior to the arbitration hearing. As stated previously, determinations as to the existence of a good faith effort are within the province of the trial court, and the ultimate decision whether to award prejudgment interest rests with the trial judge. After the trial court has made the requisite determinations in the case sub judice, this court will review its decision only for an abuse of discretion if either party elects to file an appeal. In other words, we express no opinion at this juncture as to whether appellee is entitled to an award of prejudgment interest.
The trial court's judgment with respect to the award of prejudgment interest must be reversed, and the matter must be remanded for that court to engage in the mandatory good faith analysis required by the statute. Therefore, appellant's first assignment has merit to the limited extent indicated. In addition, appellee's assignment on cross appeal is also meritorious for the reasons previously stated.
In her second assignment of error, appellant proposes that the trial court erred in awarding prejudgment interest and the costs of appellee's subsequent R.C. 3929.06 supplemental complaint because the court's July 14, 1998 order entering judgment on the arbitration award was not in conformance with R.C. 4123.931. This latter statute provides in relevant part:
"(A)The payment of compensation or benefits pursuant to this chapter or Chapter 4121., 4127., or 4131., of the Revised Code creates a right of subrogation in favor of a statutory subrogee against a third party. A statutory subrogee's subrogation interest includes past payments of compensation and medical benefits and estimated future values of compensation and medical benefits arising out of an injury to or disability or disease of a claimant.
"(B)A claimant shall notify a statutory subrogee of th
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