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Cek v. Rdoht8/4/2000
peal in the context of addressing appellant's first assignment of error.
In her first assignment of error, appellant posits that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding prejudgment interest to appellee. In this regard, she offers two reasons as to why the trial court's judgment should be reversed.
First, appellant maintains that it was not possible for the trial court to have reasonably found that she, as the party required to pay the judgment, failed to make a good faith effort to settle. In this vein, appellant argues that the uncontroverted evidence demonstrated the following with respect to the factors listed in Kalain: (1) that she fully cooperated during the discovery proceedings by submitting her answers to appellee's discovery requests within the stipulated time frames; (2) that she rationally evaluated her risks and potential liability by deposing appellee, by seeking the release of all pertinent medical records relating to the treatment of appellee for injuries stemming from the automobile accident, and by requesting a written settlement demand from appellee's counsel; (3) that she did not unnecessarily delay any of the proceedings as demonstrated by the fact that she neither objected to the matter being referred to arbitration nor appealed the resulting arbitration award; and (4) that she was not required to make a monetary settlement offer because she possessed a good faith, objectively reasonable belief that she was not solely liable for the accident.
As to this last point, appellant contends that appellee appeared to be traveling at a high rate of speed just before the collision. If appellee was unlawfully operating his truck in excess of the posted speed limit, then appellant suggests that he may have forfeited his right of way to the lane on State Route 91 which appellant entered as she executed her left turn. Moreover, appellant claims that she had an objectively reasonable belief that she exercised ordinary care in the operation of her vehicle because she was only inching slowly into appellee's lane of traffic immediately before the collision. For these reasons, appellant takes the position that she was not obliged to propose a settlement offer to appellee based on the authority of the last sentence of the Kalain syllabus, to wit: "If a party has a good faith, objectively reasonable belief that he has no liability, he need not make a monetary settlement offer."
Appellant advances a second reason as to how the trial court abused its discretion in awarding prejudgment interest to appellee. Specifically, appellant argues that there was a plethora of evidence demonstrating that appellee, as the party to whom the money was to be paid, failed to make a good faith effort to settle the case. In this regard, appellant recites several examples, including the following assertions: (1) appellee engaged in a litany of dilatory discovery tactics such as providing incomplete responses to interrogatories and delaying the release of medical records; and (2) appellee never made a written settlement demand, and he waited too long in making the oral settlement offer of $40,000 at the September 15, 1997 pretrial hearing.
In its judgment entry granting the motion for prejudgment interest, the trial court did not offer any explanation as to the reasoning underlying its decision. Rather, the trial court simply stated that " * Plaintiff is granted prejudgment interest at the statutory rate of 10% commencing on September 22, 1997 and concluding on July 14, 1998, plus post judgment interest thereafter and court costs of this motion." However, a review of the transcript from the December 23, 1998 hearing on the motion for prejudgment interest sheds light
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