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Cek v. Rdoht8/4/2000
the supplemental complaint should be dismissed because appellant had paid the judgment. Appellee requested, however, that the costs associated with the filing of the supplemental complaint be assessed against appellant. Appellee made this request based on the fact that the $30,000 check had actually been issued by Old Republic on June 17, 1998, but appellant's counsel did not forward the check until the supplemental complaint had been filed in the trial court. On October 20, 1998, the trial court issued a judgment entry dismissing the supplemental complaint and assessing the costs thereof to appellant.
The motion for prejudgment interest came on for hearing before the trial court on December 23, 1998. Counsel for both parties attended and presented oral arguments to the trial court. At the close of this proceeding, the trial court ruled that it intended to award prejudgment interest to appellee for the period commencing on September 22, 1997 through the entry of the $30,000 judgment on July 14, 1998. The trial court selected September 22, 1997 as the start date for the prejudgment interest award because it was one week after appellee's counsel had extended the oral settlement offer to appellant's counsel during the course of the September 15, 1997 pretrial hearing. The trial court entered judgment to this effect on January 13, 1998.
From this judgment, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal with this court. She now asserts the following assignments of error:
"[1.]The trial court erred in granting appellee/cross-appellant's motion for prejudgment interest, court costs therefor, and post-judgment interest thereafter.
"[2.]The trial court erred in awarding appellee/cross-appellant prejudgment interest and/or the costs of his supplemental complaint pursuant to the trial court's judgment of July 14, 1998, because said judgment was not entered in conformance with R.C. 4123.931."
Appellee filed a timely notice of cross appeal from the same judgment. He now asserts the following assignment of error on cross appeal:
"The trial court erred in failing to award plaintiff prejudgment interest from the date plaintiff's cause of action accrued."
Before addressing the substance of the assigned errors, we begin by discussing the prejudgment interest statute and the appropriate standard of review. At the time appellee commenced his civil action against appellant, R.C. 1343.03(C) read:
"(C)Interest on a judgment, decree, or order for the payment of money rendered in a civil action based on tortious conduct and not settled by agreement of the parties, shall be computed from the date the cause of action accrued to the date on which the money is paid, if, upon motion of any party to the action, the court determines at a hearing held subsequent to the verdict or decision in the action that the party required to pay the money failed to make a good faith effort to settle the case and that the party to whom the money is to be paid did not fail to make a good faith effort to settle the case."
The purpose of R.C. 1343.03(C) is "to encourage litigants to make a good faith effort to settle their case, thereby conserving legal resources and promoting judicial economy." Peyko v. Frederick (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 164, 167. The Supreme Court of Ohio has observed that:
" he statute was enacted to promote settlement efforts, to prevent parties who have engaged in tortious conduct from frivolously delaying the ultimate resolution of cases, and to encourage good faith efforts to settle controversies outside a trial setting." Kalain v. Smith (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 157, 159.
In Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med.
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