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Wolf v. Associated Materials8/15/2000
itted to use a Civ.R. 60(B) motion to turn "an unappealable event into an appealable event." Christian v. McFarland (June 20, 1997), Montgomery App. No. 15984, unreported, at 2. The court continued: Otherwise, any order of a trial court that is not a final, appealable order could be converted into a final appealable order by the simple expedient of moving, unsuccessfully, for relief from that order. In our view, the denial of relief from a non-final order is, itself, not a final appealable order. Id.
In the case sub judice, appellant moved for relief from the trial court's December 22, 1999 denial of appellant's motion to amend the complaint. The trial court's said December 22, 1999 judgment entry does not include any of the language of Civ.R. 54(B), which reads as follows: When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and whether arising out of the same or separate transactions, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may enter final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay. In the absence of a determination that there is no just reason for delay, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties, shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
On December 22, 1999, Hedstrom remained a defendant in the action, along with BWC. Thus, not all claims had yet been adjudicated at the time the trial court denied appellant's attempt to re-introduce AMI to the action. The trial court's denial of the motion to amend was therefore in the nature of an interlocutory order, despite the court's later decision to rule on the Civ.R. 60(B) motion, which is generally, by the terms of the Civil Rules, reserved for final orders or judgments. See, e.g., Jarrett v. Dayton Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. (1985), 20 Ohio St.3d 77, 78; Vanest v. Pillsbury Co. (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 525, 532. Therefore, we hold that the judgment entry of January 28, 2000, which overruled appellant's attempt to obtain relief from a non-final order, is itself not a final appealable order. This Court lacks jurisdiction to address this appeal until such time as the trial court enters a final judgment or order of dismissal. See Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pope (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 12, 19. The present appeal is hereby dismissed under the unusual procedural circumstances of this case.
By: Wise, J. Farmer, P. J., and Edwards, J., concur.
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