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Slaughter v. Klink8/18/2000
t contractor relationship are (1) whether the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business;
(2) whether the work is done by a specialist, requiring a particular skill; (3) whether the worker or the employer supplies the place and requisite instrumentalities; (4) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(5) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; and (6) whether the work is a part of the regular business of the employer. * * *
Thus, even where the proper conclusion is that there is no dispute or genuine issue of material fact as to the foregoing indicia, a trial court may inadvertently enter the pitfall of engaging in a weighing exercise while analyzing each separate factor on this question in drawing its conclusions of law. The propensity for a weighing analysis on the part of the trier of fact increases when factual elements submitted in a summary judgment exercise take on near fibers of adversarial or oppositional facts. We know of no authority which gives specific, bright-line rules to follow in carrying out this balancing process on this issue in a workers' compensation case. Therefore, such a weighing exercise may be a dangerous step toward exceeding the scope of summary judgment because it leaves room for the court to use wide discretion in construing the undisputed facts. 84 Ohio App.3d at 212.
Apparently, the legislature took note of these concerns and established a "bright-line" rule that would avoid weighing exercises.
In view of the preceding analysis, we find that the legislature intended to redefine "employee" and to substitute a statutory test for the traditional common law standard. We also find that the legislative mandate in R.C. 4123.01(A)(1)(c) is unambiguous. As a result, we cannot restrict, qualify, narrow, or enlarge the statute. Instead, we must apply the statute without interpretation. See, e.g., State ex rel. City Iron Works, Inc. v. Indus. Comm. (1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 1, 4, and Wingate v. Hordge (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 55, 58. Given these restrictions, the only conclusion we can reach is that the trial court correctly resorted to the statutory test in R.C. 4123.01(A)(1)(c). We do stress that the statute applies this test only to construction contracts, as defined in R.C. 4123.79. Consequently, the traditional common law test would still be used to evaluate employment relationships that fit within other parts of R.C. 4123.01(A)(1).
Slauter did not assign separate error to the trial court's actual application of the statutory test. However, he does mention in the first assignment of error that material issues of fact existed concerning at least ten of the twenty statutory criteria. Therefore, we will consider that issue as well.
Under R.C. 4123.01(A)(1)(c), persons who perform labor or provide services under construction contracts are "employees" if at they meet at least ten of the statutory criteria. Both sides agree that Klink's services were provided under a construction contract. As a result, the only question is whether Klink met at least ten criteria.
As a preliminary matter, we note that the facts were largely undisputed. Moreover, Slauter has not contested the trial court's decision on nine items, i.e, R.C. 4123.01(A)(1)(c)((iii), (iv), (vi), (vii), (x), (xii), (xvii), (xix), and (xx). Consequently, if the trial court was correct about at least one of the eleven remaining items, summary judgment was proper.
Slauter's discussion of the statutory factors can be divided into three main areas: 1) criteria which are not presently met because of alleged factual disputes [R.C. 4123.01(A)(1)(c)(i),(viii), (ix), (xiv), and (xviii)];
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