Slaughter v. Klink8/18/2000
Rendered on the 18th day of August, 2000.
On October 10, 1996, Appellant, William Slauter, was allegedly injured by a truck driven by Appellee, Kristine Klink. At the time, both Slauter and Klink worked for Barrett Paving Materials, Inc. After receiving Workers' Compensation benefits for his injuries, Slauter filed suit against Klink, alleging that she had negligently operated the truck. However, Klink obtained summary judgment in the trial court, based on R.C. 4123.741, which gives employees immunity from tort actions brought by co-workers. Slauter then appealed to our court.
Slauter's appeal focuses on the proper test for deciding if a person is an employee for purposes of the immunity statute. In granting summary judgment to Klink, the trial court used a test found in R.C. 4123.01(A)(1)(c). This statutory test lists twenty factors, and confers "employee" status when at least ten factors are met. According to Slauter, the trial court should instead have used an established common law test, which bestows "employee" status only if an employer retains the "right to control." In a related assignment of error, Slauter contends that if the common law test is applied, factual disputes preclude summary judgment.
I.
As an initial point, we note that our review of summary judgment decisions is de novo, i.e., we apply the standards the trial court used to decide the motion. Heinz v. Steffen (1996), 112 Ohio App.3d 174, 183. Summary judgment standards are well established, and allow judgment to be granted if the court finds:
(1) that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; (2) that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, who is entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in his favor. Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 66.
After reviewing the record, we find that the trial court properly awarded summary judgment to Klink, based on the undisputed facts and the applicable law.
In the present case, the trial court found Klink immune from suit under R.C. 4123.741, which states that:
No employee of any employer, as defined in division (B) of section 4123.01 of the Revised Code, shall be liable to respond in damages at common law or by statute for any injury or occupational disease, received or contracted by any other employee of such employer in the course of and arising out of the latter employee's employment, or for any death resulting from such injury or occupational disease, on the condition that such injury, occupational disease, or death is found to be compensable under sections 4123.01 to 4123.94, inclusive, of the Revised Code.
Under this statute, a party whose injury is found compensable under Ohio's worker compensation statutes may not pursue additional statutory or common law remedies against a co-employee. Kaiser v. Strall (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 91, 92.
Many years ago, the Ohio Supreme Court indicated that "to qualify for immunity from tort liability under R.C. 4123.741, a person must be an employee as defined in R.C. 4123.01(A)(2)." Proctor v. Ford Motor Co. (1973), 36 Ohio St.2d 3, syllabus. At the time Proctor was decided, R.C. 4123.01(A)(2) defined "employee" as " very person in the service of any * * * private corporation * * * but not including any person whose employment is casual and not in the usual course of his employer's business." Id. at 4. Notably, the statute did not define the phrase "in the service of." This phrase had been used for
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