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Estate Of Raymond v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.8/23/2000 ed to establish a proper foundation for his testimony, pursuant to Evid. R. 705. We disagree.
A determination as to the admissibility of expert testimony is a matter within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Miller v. Bike Athletic Co. (1998), 80 Ohio St.3d 607, 616. Moreover, " he decision whether to sanction a party by the exclusion of expert testimony is largely a matter of discretion for the trial court." Loura v. Adler (1995), 105 Ohio App.3d 634, 640, citing to Pang v. Minch (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 186, 194. A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts in an unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable manner. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219.
Foundational requirements for an expert's opinion testimony are set forth in Evid. R. 703 and 705. Patrick v. Painesville Commercial Properties (1997), 123 Ohio App.3d 575, 586. Evid. R. 703 authorizes two permissible sources of facts and data upon which an expert may base his opinion:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by him or admitted in evidence at the hearing.
The Ohio Supreme Court has noted that Evid. R. 703 is written in the disjunctive. Therefore, the rule is satisfied when an expert opinion is based either on perception or on facts or data admitted in evidence. State v. Solomon (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 124, 126. In her brief, appellant acknowledges that the requirements of Evid. R. 703 were met here, since the medical records containing the facts upon which Dr. Trangle based his testimony were admitted in evidence.
Evid. R. 705 provides that the facts or data upon which the expert's opinion is based are to be disclosed prior to rendering the opinion:
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his reason therefor after disclosure of the underlying facts or data.
It is Evid. R. 705 that appellant argues mandates exclusion of Dr. Trangle's testimony for failure to preface his opinions with disclosure of the facts upon which those opinions were based. In particular, appellant contends that Dr. Trangle should not have been permitted to testify as to the effects of Mr. Raymond's alcoholism, because there was no evidence in the record, prior to his testimony, that Mr. Raymond was an alcoholic.
The purpose of Evid. R. 705 is to aid the trier of fact in assessing the validity of the expert's opinion.
Requiring the expert to inform the jury of the basis supporting his or her opinion is both sensible and logical.
* The opinion would be irrelevant and misleading if grounded on facts ultimately discounted by the trier of fact. * Thus, the trier of fact cannot adequately assess the validity of expert testimony without knowing the particular facts which support the expert opinion. By requiring disclosure of the facts or data underlying the opinion prior to rendering the opinion, Ohio Rule 705 seeks to aid the trier of fact in its assessment of the validity of the expert's opinion. 1 Weissenberger's Ohio Evidence (1993), 18, Section 705.2. (Footnotes omitted.), quoted in Wells v. Miami Valley Hosp. (1993), 90 Ohio App.3d 840, 857.
Here, the trial transcript supports appellees' contention that these facts were fully disclosed before Dr. Trangle offered any opinion as to the cause of Mr. Raymond's death. The underlying facts upon which Dr. Trangle based his testimony were contained in Mr. Raymond's medical records, which Dr. Trangle reviewed, at the request of appellees' counsel, prior to trial.
Q: Doctor, do you recall my asking you to review
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