 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
T&T;Communications8/25/2000
is clear and, therefore, additional briefs are not necessary. See State v. Bailey (Dec. 22, 1989), Wood App. No. WD-89-28, unreported, citing Toledo's Great Eastern Shoppers City, Inc. v. Abde's Black Angus Steak House No. III, Inc. (1986), 24 Ohio St.3d 198.
In the case sub judice, the court has decided, sua sponte, to address whether appellee, in fact, breached the agreement provision requiring him to supply workers' compensation insurance for his employees or agents. In appellant's motion for relief from judgment, filed in the proceedings below, appellant argues that the agreement provision does not specifically require that appellant be required to supply workers' compensation for himself. We agree.
In addressing this issue, we turn to the elementary rules of contract construction which provide that where contract language is ambiguous a court may construe the language of the contract for "' he construction of written contracts and instruments of conveyance is a matter of law.'" Latina v. Woodpath Development Co. (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 212, 214, quoting Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line, Co. (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 241, paragraph one of the syllabus. In construing the language of a contract, any ambiguities must be resolved against the drafter. Central Realty Co. v. Clutter (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 411, 413.
In the instant case, because we find that an ambiguity exists as to whether appellant was required to cover himself under workers' compensation, and the agreement was drafted by appellee, we find that appellant was not required to provide himself with workers' compensation coverage. Thus, the trial court erred when it awarded appellee attorney fees stemming from the workers' compensation action. Accordingly, based upon our sua sponte disposition of the matter, we find appellant's stated assignments of error, as they pertain to the trial court's award of attorney fees, well-taken.
On consideration whereof, we find that substantial justice has not been done the party complaining, and the judgment of the Bryan Municipal Court it reversed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to appellee.
JUDGMENT REVERSED.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See, also, 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4, amended 1/1/98.
James R. Sherck, J. JUDGE
Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. JUDGE CONCUR.
Richard W. Knepper, P.J. JUDGE CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY.
|