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Reed v. Furr's Supermarkets8/22/2000
gment on the merits for purposes of res judicata). Denying costs to a prevailing party is within the district court's discretion; however, such discretion is not unlimited and the court must articulate the reasons for its ruling. See Key v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 2000-NMSC-010, 7, 9, 128 N.M. 739, 998 P.2d 575.
But Rule 1-054(F) also provides that Rule 1-054 does not apply to "claims for fees and expenses as sanctions." In its ruling at the hearing on the motion for costs, the district court viewed the imposition of costs as an additional sanction against Plaintiff. The district court stated: " ismissing the case is the heaviest hammer I have. It's the biggest sanction I have. And on that basis, I'm not going to award any costs in this case because I think the sanctions I've already imposed are great enough, frankly."
The district court imposed the severe sanction of dismissal against Plaintiff in the underlying action. When sanctions are imposed, costs can be viewed as sanctions as well. In such circumstances, we cannot state that the district court abused its discretion in viewing the assessment of costs as an additional sanction and relying upon this articulated reasoning as the good cause for refusing to award FSI its costs. See Rule 1-054(D); Key, 2000-NMSC-010, 7, 9 (stating that the district court has discretion in assessing costs).
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the orders of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's case with prejudice for discovery abuse and denying FSI its costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge WE CONCUR:
A. JOSEPH ALARID, Judge
MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge
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