 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Reed v. Furr's Supermarkets8/22/2000
explanations for the discrepancies between her discovery answers and her medical records. Plaintiff asserts that the presence of her explanations prevents a finding that she misrepresented information during discovery. We disagree.
Plaintiff failed to persuade the district court in her submitted affidavit that she had not intentionally misrepresented her medical history. Because we review for abuse of discretion, Plaintiff's argument that she misunderstood the nature and extent of FSI's questions is an insufficient basis to reverse the district court's order of dismissal. See Medina, 117 N.M. at 165-66, 870 P.2d at 127-28 (holding that sanction of dismissal was appropriate applying abuse of discretion standard when the plaintiff argued on appeal that discovery responses were not false); United Nuclear Corp., 96 N.M. at 214, 239, 629 P.2d at 290, 315 (explaining that one party's narrow construction of the other party's interrogatories was a "strained interpretation" which amounted to "`an attempt at gamesmanship, contrary to the principle that the purpose of our rules of discovery is to minimize concealment and surprise in litigation'" (quoting Hilmer v. Hezel, 492 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973))). Moreover, we are concerned with misrepresentations during discovery in the first instance, not the presence of explanations after the fact. Dismissal was appropriate in this case considering the fact that Plaintiff's continual misrepresentations circumvented discovery as a "mechanism for narrowing the issues and ascertaining the facts." 8 Wright, supra, § 2001, at 43. Plaintiff's discovery abuse also adversely affected the "integrity of the truth-seeking function of the [district] court." United Nuclear Corp., 96 N.M. at 238, 629 P.2d at 314. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Plaintiff's case, despite the presence of Plaintiff's explanations. See id. at 223, 629 P.2d at 299 ("`Ultimately, the question of what constitutes satisfactory responses to interrogatories rests within the sound discretion of the Court.'" (quoting Martin v. Easton Publ'g Co., 85 F.R.D. 312, 316 (E.D. Pa. 1980))).
FSI's Cross-Appeal
FSI cross-appeals the district court's order denying FSI its costs. FSI argues that the district court abused it discretion in denying costs based on the presumption that the prevailing party is entitled to costs. See Marchman v. NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank, 120 N.M. 74, 94-95, 898 P.2d 709, 729-30 (1995); NMSA 1978, § 39-3-30 (1966); Rule 1-054(D) NMRA 2000. Section 39-3-30 provides that " n all civil actions or proceedings of any kind, the party prevailing shall recover his costs against the other party unless the court orders otherwise for good cause shown." See also Rule 1-054(D)(1) (stating that costs "shall be allowed as a matter of course . . . unless the court otherwise directs").
FSI assumes that it is a "prevailing party." A "`prevailing party is the party who wins the lawsuit--that is, a plaintiff who recovers a judgment or a defendant who avoids an adverse judgment.'" Marchman, 120 N.M. at 95, 898 P.2d at 730 (quoting Dunleavy v. Miller, 116 N.M. 353, 360, 862 P.2d 1212, 1219 (1993)). The merits of a dispute must ordinarily be reached in order to designate a prevailing party. See Marchman, 120 N.M. at 95, 898 P.2d at 730 (stating that a dismissal for forum non conveniens did not qualify as a decision on the merits). A dismissal with prejudice is an adjudication on the merits, and thus FSI is entitled to the presumption in favor of awarding costs to a prevailing party. See Campos v. Brown Constr. Co., 85 N.M. 684, 686, 515 P.2d 1288, 1290 (Ct. App. 1973) (stating that dismissal with prejudice is a jud
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 New Mexico Employee Leasing Services
Employee Leasing Services
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|