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Reed v. Furr's Supermarkets8/22/2000
smiss, which resulted in the court's improper evaluation of her credibility. But Plaintiff fails to account for the difference between a witness's credibility at trial, which determination is reserved for the fact finder, and the role of the district court during a motion hearing. See Thomasson v. Johnson, 120 N.M. 512, 514, 903 P.2d 254, 256 (Ct. App. 1995) (stating that in motion for modification of child support, district court can evaluate credibility); State v. Anderson, 107 N.M. 165, 167, 754 P.2d 542, 544 (Ct. App. 1988) (stating that voluntariness of consent during a suppression hearing is a factual question to be resolved by the district court and that credibility of the witnesses can be determined); State v. Boeglin, 100 N.M. 127, 132, 666 P.2d 1274, 1279 (Ct. App. 1983) (stating that in a motion to suppress, the district court is the trier of fact and that resolution of credibility is appropriate).
We emphasize that the hearing arose from FSI's motion to dismiss for discovery abuse. The district court, as the arbiter of discovery, can determine whether a party has abused the discovery process. We do not empanel a jury for every pre-trial issue that arises in a case. Such a requirement would unduly burden pre-trial procedure.
In this case, the motion alleged that Plaintiff had misrepresented the nature of her medical history and her employment history. Plaintiff responded to those allegations by filing an affidavit. The district court could properly decide whether Plaintiff had abused the discovery process on the record before it, based upon an evaluation of the truthfulness of Plaintiff's answers. See Medina, 117 N.M. at 165-66, 870 P.2d at 127-28 (upholding district court's finding that party had given false answers to discovery inquiries). The district court's determination that Plaintiff abused the discovery process did not usurp trial on the merits solely because such determination involved a consideration of Plaintiff's credibility as an affiant during discovery. The district court's assessment of credibility as it relates to abuse of the discovery process is merely a determination of whether the party was providing answers that obstructed the discovery process. This determination, while it does involve credibility and truthfulness, does not preempt trial on the merits because the district court is not deciding the truth of the merits or the ultimate facts of the case. As a result, insofar as Plaintiff's credibility was considered by the district court to determine whether she abused the discovery process, the court did not usurp the jury's function and did not err.
FSI's Failure to Demonstrate Prejudice to Either FSI or the Discovery Process
Plaintiff further argues that FSI failed to demonstrate that it was hindered in its ability to gather information or that Plaintiff's actions prejudiced the discovery process. We interpret this argument as asserting that FSI had the burden to show such prejudice.
Our Supreme Court's opinion in Medina does not address the lack of a demonstration of prejudice as a basis for reversing a district court's order dismissing a plaintiff's case, as discussed in Bustillos, 116 N.M. at 677-78, 866 P.2d at 405-06. We glean from Medina, however, that the party seeking dismissal does not have to show prejudice to its trial preparation to be entitled to dismissal.
As we have discussed, in Medina, the Supreme Court clarified that Sandoval does not require as a precondition to dismissal: (1) that the party seeking dismissal be deceived in fact or that the party relied on the misrepresentations; (2) that the information misrepresented be critical to preparation for trial; and
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