 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Gordon v. Gordon7/28/2000
7 (1956).
In interpreting the aforementioned statutory provisions, we must consider the statement of public policy contained in Ind. Code § 22-6-1- 2. In pertinent part, this statute provides that a worker shall be entitled "to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment," and that such entitlement comes from his ability to obtain "full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor or their agents" in obtaining such self- organization.
We must agree with the trial court that Janet's claim pertains to a matter that, while occurring at the workplace, is personal in nature. The ability to sexually, verbally, and/or mentally abuse a co-worker is not an acceptable term or condition of employment. It therefore is not a "freedom" which is protected by the Anti-Injunction Act.
Benny also contends that the trial court's jurisdiction in this case was pre-empted by federal labor law. Although Benny fails to identify any applicable federal statute, he does cite to Jobes v. Tokheim Corp., 657 N.E.2d 145 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) in support of his contention.
In Jobes, we held that the plaintiff's claims were pre-empted because they were governed by a collective bargaining agreement. 657 N.E.2d at 149.
We further held that a state remedy is prohibited if the controversy is "inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement such that it cannot be considered independent thereof." Id. at 148. In the present case, Janet's claim is not based upon any of Benny's rights under the collective bargaining agreement. As we held above, Janet's claim refers to a personal controversy that occurs at, but is independent of, the workplace.
Benny contends that Janet's petition for a protective order did not comply with Ind. Code § 34-26-2-2(2). He states that the statute requires that a petition for a protective order must include "any allegation concerning the date and manner of specific acts or feared acts of abuse, harassment, or disruption of the peace of the petitioner . . . ."
Benny misreads the statute, which requires that the petition include "any allegation concerning the date or manner of specific acts." (emphasis supplied). The apparent intent of the statute is to give the respondent sufficient notice to allow him to prepare a defense against the allegations contained in the petition. Our examination of Janet's petition reveals that it could have been more specific as to the dates of the acts, but the indication of a general time frame, coupled with the recitation of the manner of specific acts, was sufficient to give Benny notice of the allegations against him.
Benny also contends that the evidence presented at the hearing on the petition was insufficient to form the basis for the issuance of the protective order. Benny argues that the incidents of inappropriate physical contact and remarks were too infrequent to warrant the issuance of a permanent protective order. He further argues that "such conduct, even if it may have been unpleasant, would not constitute egregious abuse of Janet but instead would constitute ordinary horseplay in the workplace." Appellant's Brief at 15.
Janet alleged in her petition that on five occasions Benny pressed his body against her and "humped" her. She also alleged a specific occasion where Benny took her statements out of context and expressed that he loved it when "she talked dirty" to him. At the hearing, she testified concerning these and
Page 1 2 3 4 Indiana Employee Leasing Services
Employee Leasing Services
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|