 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Selva v. Quebecor Printing Dallas2/12/2002
Justice Wright
Linda Selva appeals the no-evidence summary judgment rendered in favor of Selva's former employer, Quebecor Printing Dallas, Inc., individually and doing business as Quebecor Printing Dallas L.P., a division of Quebecor Printing Group, Inc., doing business as Quebecor Printing (USA) Corp. Selva brings two issues contending that the trial court erred by: (1) granting the motion for summary judgment because she produced some evidence; and (2) striking paragraph nine of her affidavit. The facts of this case are known to the parties, and we do not recite them in detail here. Further, because all dispositive issues are clearly settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. We overrule appellant's issues and affirm the trial court's judgment.
Initially, we will address Quebecor's argument that Selva cannot complain about the trial court's decision to sustain its objections to her affidavit or to grant Quebecor's motion for summary judgment because she did not raise these complaints in her motion for new trial. A motion for new trial is not a prerequisite for an appeal of a summary judgment proceeding. Lee v. Braeburn Valley West Civic Ass'n, 786 S.W.2d 262, 263 (Tex. 1990). Because a motion for new trial is not necessary to preserve complaints regarding a summary judgment proceeding, Quebecor's argument lacks merit.
In its motion for summary judgment, Quebecor claimed Selva could not offer any evidence showing Quebecor intended to discriminate against her when it terminated Selva's employment. In response, Selva filed an affidavit claiming, among other things, that she was "deprived of Quebecor's normal severance package," unlike several male employees. Specifically, in paragraph nine of her affidavit, Selva testifies concerning the calculation of Quebecor's normal severance package and then states that, " pon information and belief these same severance benefits have been paid to the following Quebecor male employees that were not of Japanese national origin/race, obviously not female, and some were not in the protected age class, all of whom were similarly situated, regardless of the reason for separation, that is whether or not the male employee was laid off or terminated for allegations of wrongful conduct or not." Selva then named four male employees she claimed were treated differently.
Quebecor filed a motion to strike and objections to Selva's affidavit claiming, among other things, that this portion of paragraph nine was not made on personal knowledge and contained hearsay. The trial court sustained Quebecor's objections to the complained-of portion of paragraph nine, and then granted Quebecor's motion for summary judgment. Both parties agree that if the trial court properly sustained Quebecor's objections to paragraph nine, the no-evidence summary judgment is proper. After reviewing the record, we cannot conclude that Selva has shown the trial court abused its discretion by sustaining Quebecor's objections to the complained-of portions of paragraph nine. See Wolfe v. C.S.P.H., Inc., 24 S.W.3d 641, 646 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, no pet.) (trial court's ruling concerning admission of summary judgment evidence reviewed for abuse of discretion).
Except as authorized by statute, a summary judgment affidavit "is insufficient unless the allegations contained therein are direct and unequivocal and perjury can be assigned upon it." Brownlee v. Brownlee, 665 S.W.2d 111, 112 (Tex. 1984); Burke v. Satterfield, 525 S.W.2d 950, 955 (Tex. 1975). In other words, the affiant must "positively and unqualifiedly represent the 'facts' disclosed in the affidavit to be true
Page 1 2 Texas Employee Leasing Services
Employee Leasing Services
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|