 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Preston v. Transportation Insurance Co.2/13/2002
ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary: Insurer moved for summary judgment, arguing petition to reopen settlement agreement on ground of mutual mistake of fact was barred by two-year statute of limitations set out in section 27-2-203, MCA.
Held: Motion denied where claim to reopen is based on allegation parties were mistaken about extent of claimant's mental condition and her inability to work in any capacity, but undisputed facts do not establish claimant knew or should have known of this condition and inability to work more than two years prior to filing date of petition.
Topics:
Settlements: Reopening: Mistake of Fact. Insurer moved for summary judgment on ground claimant did not file petition for hearing within two years of when she knew, or should have known, basis for claim to reopen settlement agreement. Motion denied where undisputed evidence does not establish that claimant knew or should have known of the extent of her allegedly work-related mental condition and inability to work more than two years prior to filing date.
Before the Court is Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Transportation Insurance Company (Transportation). Transportation argues that the petition, which seeks to set aside a settlement agreement on the basis of mutual mistake of fact, is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
Facts
The uncontroverted facts are as follows:
a On September 14, 1994, petitioner was injured in the course and scope of employment. (Petition for Hearing 1; Respondent's Undisputed Fact 1.)
b On August 11, 1995, petitioner settled her workers' compensation claim with Transportation. The settlement was approved by the Employment Relations Division of the Department of Labor and Industry. (Petition for Hearing 2; Respondent's Undisputed Fact 2.)
c At the time of the settlement, petitioner had been treated for depression but had returned to work. (Petition for Hearing at 3, admitted by respondent.)
d On February 12, 1999, Mary Ann Evans, M.D. prepared an "initial intake" following examination of claimant. Her assessment included:
Panic Disorder with agoraphobia, severe. Major depressive disorder, single episode, recurrent, severe. PTSD. Pathologic gambling. (Respondent's Reply Brief In Support Of It's Motion For Summary Judgment, Ex. 1; Evans Dep. at 60-61.) Claimant testified at deposition that she recalled Dr. Evans discussing diagnoses with her during February, 1999. (Preston Dep. at 25, 34-35.) Dr. Evans testified she believed these diagnoses were work-related. (Evans Dep. at 62-63.)
e On April 19, 1999, Patrick Wallace, the adjuster in charge of the claim, wrote jointly to claimant and her attorney at the time, Mr. Randall O. Skorheim. The letter included:
It is our understanding from the telephone calls we've had from Ms. Preston that she is requesting Workers' Compensation benefits for psychiatric care. As I explained to Ms. Preston on the telephone on April 1, 1999, based upon the information that the insurer has, no benefits will be provided for psychiatric care. Any claims for any benefits relating to this kind of treatment are respectfully denied. This denial of benefits refers to the 09-14-94 incident, which claim was settled. It also refers to a filing of 06-25-98, which claim was abandoned. (Letter of April 19, 1999, attached to Affidavit of Patrick Wallace.)
f On August 25, 1999, petitioner resigned from her employment. (Affidavit of Roger Bridgeford at 1.)
g On November 29, 2000, petitioner, through her attorney, submitted a Petiti
Page 1 2 3 Montana Employee Leasing Services
Employee Leasing Services
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|