Stedman v. Cox2/15/2002
UNPUBLISHED
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court's order granting summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) and dismissing plaintiff's claims of age discrimination and retaliation against defendant, her former employer, arising out of defendant's termination of plaintiff's employment. We affirm.
I.
First, plaintiff claims that, in dismissing her age discrimination and retaliation claims, the trial court failed to consider evidence in the record supporting her contention that defendant's assertion of poor performance after more than twenty-seven years of employment was false and a pretext for age discrimination and retaliation.
We review de novo the trial court's decision granting summary disposition. Lytle v Malady (On Rehearing), 458 Mich 153, 177; 579 NW2d 906 (1998). This Court, as the court below, is to consider the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other documentary evidence submitted or filed in the action to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists to warrant a trial. Wilcoxon v Minnesota Mining & Mfg Co, 235 Mich App 347, 357-358; 597 NW2d 250 (1999). Here, as below, all reasonable inferences are to be resolved in the nonmoving party's favor, plaintiff in this case. Id. at 358. We do not make factual findings or weigh the credibility of the evidence. Lytle, supra at 176.
The trial court appropriately examined the pleadings, depositions and other documentary evidence presented by the parties and found that plaintiff could establish a prima facie case of age discrimination because (1) she was a member of the protected class, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, (3) she was qualified for her position, and (4) she was replaced by a younger person. Lytle, supra at 177. The trial court then correctly noted that, plaintiff having established a prima facie case, the burden shifted to defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff's termination. Lytle, supra at 173. We agree with the trial court that defendant successfully articulated a legitimate reason to discharge plaintiff, which was amply supported by the record, that although her legal and technical skills were excellent, her interpersonal skills needed significant improvement.
The trial court next appropriately recognized that once defendant clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, that there was a legitimate reason for plaintiff's discharge, the burden shifted back to plaintiff to show, by a preponderance of admissible direct or circumstantial evidence, that a triable issue of fact exists that defendant's proffered reasons were a mere pretext for discrimination, i.e., that discrimination was a motivating factor for her termination. Lytle, supra at 174, 176. Plaintiff could establish that defendant's articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual: (1) by showing that the reason had no basis in fact, (2) if the reason had a basis in fact, by showing that it was not the actual factor motivating the decision, or (3) if it was a factor, by showing that it was insufficient to justify the decision. Feick v Monroe Co, 229 Mich App 335, 343; 582 NW2d 207 (1998). See also Lytle, supra at 178. We hold that, even when viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff failed to show, by a preponderance of admissible direct or circumstantial evidence, that a triable issue of fact exists that defendant's proffered reasons for firing plaintiff were a mere pretext for age discrimination. Lytle, supra at 174, 176.
II.
Next, plaintiff claims that the trial court erred by failing to consider direct evidence of discriminatio
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