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State v. Harada2/25/2002
." They repeated the announcement once inside. Their entry violated neither the terms of HRS § 803-37 nor the purposes of the knock and announce statute. Therefore, the search was valid. Eleneki, 92 Hawaii at 567, 993 P.2d at 1196 (footnote omitted).
Thus, Contreras-Ceballos is analogous to Eleneki and distinguishable from the instant case because, in both Contreras-Ceballos and Eleneki, the officers had complied with the statute. Based on the foregoing and the facts of this case, we believe that law enforcement officers are required to comply with the knock and announce statute when a ruse is accompanied by force.
Such a requirement best serves the purposes of the rule, which are (1) to reduce potential violence to both occupants and police resulting from an unannounced entry, (2) to prevent unnecessary property damage, and (3) to protect an occupant's right to privacy. See Eleneki at 566, 993 P.2d at 1195 (citing Dixon, 83 Hawaii at 22, 924 P.2d at 190). If police are not required to comply with the knock and announce rule upon applying force to gain entry, the potential for violence and unnecessary property damage will increase.
Justice Ramil's dissent relies heavily on the language of the statute to declare that "an officer must comply with the knock and announce rule if the door is 'shut.'" J. Ramil, dissenting op. at 2 (emphasis added). Although the triggering language in the search warrant statute is "if the doors are shut," the triggering language in the arrest warrant statute is "when entrance is refused." Compare HRS § 803-11 with HRS § 803-37. Notwithstanding that distinction, we specifically stated inEleneki that, " lthough the language of HRS §§ 803-11 and 803-37 differs, the purposes of the 'knock and announce' rule are identical in each context and the use of a ruse[, which is permissible to gain entrance in the execution of an arrest warrant,] is also consistent with those purposes in the execution of a search warrant." Eleneki, 92 Hawaii at 565, 993 P.2d at 1194 (emphasis added). Thus, in both contexts, we have determined that a ruse is permissible (i.e., that the use of a ruse does not necessarily violate either statute) -- notwithstanding the fact that the statutes are silent on the issue -- because the purposes behind the statutes are identically served.
Justice Ramil's narrow view of the search warrant statute creates an incongruity between the application of the knock and announce requirement when executing an arrest warrant and when executing a search warrant. Under the analysis proffered in Justice Ramil's dissenting opinion, an officer executing a search warrant will not be required to comply with the knock and announce statute when a ruse is employed, the occupant voluntarily opens the door and then attempts to close it, and the officer uses force to gain entry. By contrast, an officer executing an arrest warrant, under the same circumstances, would be required to comply with the knock and announce statute. This incongruity begs the question of what happens when the officers are simultaneously executing both an arrest and a search warrant. We believe that the relevant analysis should instead focus upon whether a "breaking" has occurred. See Dixon, 83 Hawaii at 16, 924 P.2d at 184. Under theDixon analysis and the cases previously cited, a "breaking" occurs where force is used to gain entry.
Finally, Justice Ramil contends that our analysis and conclusion in the instant case would lead to the "nonsensical procedure" described by the Ninth Circuit in Contreras-Ceballos. J. Ramil, dissenting op. at 18. The court in Contreras-Ceballos stated that requiring the officers to knock and announce after the door was opened, but was subsequentl
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