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State v. Harada2/25/2002
nock and announce rule (emphasis added)); (e) United States v. Syler, 430 F.2d 68, 70 (7th Cir. 1970) (holding that no "breaking" occurred where a defendant partially opened the door and agents opened the door further and entered because " o attempt was made to bar his way and no force was applied in gaining entry" (emphasis added)); (f) United States v. Raines, 536 F.2d 796, 800 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that " police entry into a private home by invitation without force, though the invitation be obtained by a ruse, is not a breaking and does not invoke the [knock and announce rule]" (emphasis added)); (g) State v. Iverson, 272 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 1978) (holding that entrance to a home gained by ruse was reasonable where " o force was threatened or used" and " o breaking occurred" (emphasis added)); (h) Palmer v. State, 426 So. 2d 950, 953 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983) (stating that "an entry obtained by deception or ruse, without the use of any force, is not violative of the knock and announce statute" (emphasis added)); and (i) Ryals v. State, 498 So. 2d 1365, 1366 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (adopting the rationale of the cases holding that entry by deception does not violate the knock and announce rule because no "breaking" or use of force occurs (emphasis added))).
Justice Ramil indicates that seven of the nine foregoing cases involve situations where no force was used, seemingly suggesting that these cases are, therefore, inapplicable to this case. J. Ramil, dissenting op. at 10. All nine cases, however, are cited in Dixon [hereinafter, the Dixon cases] and support our interpretation of the proposition espoused therein, with which Justice Ramil has no dispute. The Dixon cases also support our interpretation of the proposition for which Eleneki stands. Justice Ramil's implication that these cases are inapplicable to this case ignores the fact that these cases permit the use of a ruse because no force or threat of force was involved -- which is precisely why these cases are relevant.
Additionally, with respect to the remaining two cases cited above, Gatewood and Syler, Justice Ramil indicates that Gatewood is "inapplicable" and that Syler, "indeed," is contrary to the majority's holding in the case at bar. See J. Ramil, dissenting op. at 11. The central proposition in Gatewood -- that officers may not gain entrance to a person's home through "falsehood followed by force, without first disclosing to [that person] the true reason they wish to enter," is directly relevant to our holding in this case. Moreover, the proposition for which we cited Gatewood still stands in that jurisdiction. See United States v. Covington, 385 A.2d 164, 167 (D.C. 1978) (cited in Coleman v. United States, 738 A.2d 1230 (D.C. 1999)).
Next, Justice Ramil indicates that Syler "actually contradicts proposition" and points to the following language from Syler:
We also agree with the district court's finding that force was not employed to gain entrance to the bungalow and no violation of the principles of Sabbath v. United States[, 391 U.S. 585 (1968),] occurred. The facts conceded by defendant show that the front door was already open. Apparently responding to the announcement of the arrival of the "Gas man," defendant unlatched the screen door and partly opened it. [The officer] merely completed the operation voluntarily initiated by defendant. No attempt was made to bar his way and no force was applied in gaining entry. J. Ramil, dissenting op. at 11 (quoting Syler, 430 F.2d at 70) (underscored emphases in dissent) (bold emphases added).
Based on the foregoing, Justice Ramil concludes that, "according to the reasoning of this case . . . an officer's further opening of an already open doo
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