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State v. Harada2/25/2002
awaii at 21-22, 924 P.2d at 189-90. The majority appears to believe that there are no other safeguards to protect a defendant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure other than the knock and announce statute. Indeed, if all one has is a knock and announce requirement, then any scenario concerning execution of a search or arrest warrant -- even if the door is open (and entry has been gained) -- seems to invoke such requirement. Thus, the majority sneaks this case, where the front door is already open, through the backdoor analysis of the knock and announce statute.
Rather, after the door is opened, the reasonableness standard -- not the knock and announce requirements -- applies. Of course, under some circumstances, the officers may well be required to announce their office and business, as entailed by the knock and announce statute. The reasonableness standard, however, does not incorrigibly demand a mechanistic and formulaic incantation to be recited, before using force on an already-opened door.
Here, I would hold that the officers' ruse entry and subsequent use of force were reasonable under the state and federal constitutions. The constitutional protections include the right of Harada to be secure in his house "against unreasonable searches and seizures" and "against unreasonable invasions of privacy." Dixon, 83 Hawaii at 22, 924 P.2d at 190. Given that the officers had a valid search warrant, the privacy interest protected by the state and federal constitutions was "minimal" because "it is only the occupant's privacy for the span of time between the announcement and the actual entry that is implicated." Id. at 23, 924 P.2d at 191. The facts, as described by the majority, that (1) Harada was aware of the officers' presence outside his apartment, majority at 4, and (2) Harada might destroy evidence, namely the narcotics, if given an opportunity to do so after closing his door, demonstrate that Officer Bermudes's use of force to keep the door open was reasonable.
In my view, the use of the appropriate reasonableness standard, rather than the now-irrelevant knock and announce statute, allows for an accurate analysis of the situation. As this court explained, quoting the United States Supreme Court, the knock and announce principle "is an element of the reasonableness inquiry under the fourth amendment." Dixon, 83 Hawaii at 22, 924 P.2d at 190 (quoting Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934); see also Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 387 (1997). Thus, the knock and announce rule serves effectively as a proxy for reasonableness of the officers' gaining entry when the door is shut. But the knock and announce statute cannot be transformed into the sole, dispositive question in determining reasonableness in all cases, regardless of whether the door is shut. Here, the majority appears to believe that use of force on an open door is sufficient to invoke the knock and announce requirements, which relate to force on a shut door.
V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, I dissent -- mindful of Justice Cardozo's admonition against the "tyranny of labels": the indiscriminate application of generalized legal principles to every and all potentially related cases, no matter how tenuous the connection, as a substitute for a well-considered application of the law as both written and intended by the legislature. Snyder v. Commonwealth, 291 U.S. 97, 114 (1934), overruled on other grounds by, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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