State v. Harada2/25/2002
door to close." Even if officers need not wait for the door to close or for a reasonable amount of time, requiring the officers to state their office and business, and demand entry, as the majority absolutely requires here, is still unreasonable. See infra Section III.
In a subsequent case, in 1998, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed that the "knock and announce" requirements apply only to closed -- not open -- doors:
[The knock and announce statute] does not apply to officers who enter through open doors. SeeUnited States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 1361, 1365 (9th Cir. 1979) ("entry through an open door is not a 'breaking' within the meaning of the statute"); United States v. Vargas, 436 F.2d 1280, 1281 (9th Cir. 1971) ("thrust of [knock and announce statute] . . . is aimed at the closed or locked door")." United States v. Phillips, 149 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 1998).
The majority, however, relies on "old" cases that are irrelevant, majority at 11-14, as a substitute for focusing on the recent federal case law that directly addresses the issue in question.
III. POLICY REASONS FOR KNOCK AND ANNOUNCE RULE
In order to understand Hawaii and federal case law, it is essential to examine the articulated purposes of the knock and announce statutes:
1. reduction of potential violence to both occupants and police resulting from an unannounced entry, 2. prevention of unnecessary property damage, and 3. protection of an occupant's right to privacy Eleneki, 92 Hawaii at 566, 993 P.2d at 1195 (quoting Dixon, 83 Hawaii at 22, 924 P.2d at 190); see also Contreras-Ceballos, 999 F.2d at 434-35.
A ruse requires the occupant to open the door consciously, thereby achieving these three objectives. Ruse entries, even if later followed by force, are "invariably characterized by some degree of advance notice; the occupant is expecting an entry." Eleneki, 92 Hawaii at 566, 993 P.2d at 1195 (citation omitted); Coleman v. United States, 728 A.2d 1230, 1235 (D.C. 1999) (citation omitted). Similarly, the Ninth Circuit, in ruling that federal agents entering an open door need not comply with the knock and announce statute, noted that the occupants expected entry: "A significant factor [in determining that the knock and announce statute was not invoked] here was the immediate presence of [Defendant] and his friend (about to be arrested) right inside the door. It was not a case of officers sneaking in and going prowling." United States v. Vargas, 436 F.2d 1280, 1281 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
In Eleneki, this court determined that because the door was "open," the knock and announce requirements did not apply. Nevertheless, the majority here asserts:
At the point that Harada opened his door in response to the ruse, there was no breaking within the meaning of HRS § 803-37. However, a breaking occurred when Officer Bermudes used force to prevent Harada from closing the door. Consequently, the requirements of HRS § 803-37 were triggered, and the officers were required to declare their office, their business, and demand entrance. Majority at 26 (citations omitted) (emphases added).
But the Ninth Circuit has expressly warned against requiring such "nonsensical procedure":
[The officers] use of force to keep the door open, and to enter, did not implicate [the knock and announce requirements]. Accord United States v. Salter, 815 F.2d 1150, 1152 (7th Cir. 1987). To rule otherwise would dictate a nonsensical procedure in which the officers, after having employed a permissible ruse to cause the door to be opened, must permit it to be shut by the occupants so that the officers could then knock, reannounce, and open t
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