 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
State v. Harada2/25/2002
uded that a person's expectation of privacy under article 1, § 7 of the Hawaii Constitution is greater than that under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution." (Citation omitted.)), and in consideration of the protection expressly provided for against invasions of privacy, see Lopez, 78 Hawaii at 446, 896 P.2d at 902 (" nlike its federal counterpart, article I, section 7, specifically protects against 'invasions of privacy.'" (Citation omitted.)); State v. Vinuya, 96 Hawaii 472, 484, 32 P.3d 116, 128 (App. 2001) (" e have not hesitatedto extend the protections afforded under article I, section 7 of the Hawaii State Constitution beyond those available under the cognate Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution when logic and a sound regard for the purposes of those protections have so warranted." (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)). With due regard for the majority position, the analysis employed in Dixon, see supra Part X.A. & B., is bereft of such principles. In deciding the applicability of article I, section 7 to this case, any analysis must be rooted in our long held view of the protection it affords the people of our state. It is, after all, intrusion by government that we are concerned with, not simply the act of opening a door.
XI.
The conduct of police officers in executing warrants is circumscribed by our state statutes. To uphold the use of ruses in the circumstances presented by the cases discussed contravenes such limitations. In a world that tolerates such ruses, a person can never be certain for whom or for what purpose he or she has opened the door.
DISSENTING OPINION BY RAMIL, J.
My disagreement with the majority centers on the proper scope of the knock and announce rule. Here, Harada voluntarily opened the door three-feet-wide (or three-quarters of the way open). After realizing that officers were outside, Harada attempted to close the door. In response, Officer Bermudes entered and prevented the door from being shut. I believe that the door in this case is "open" for purposes of the knock and announce statute and, therefore, the subsequent use of force in keeping the door open must be analyzed under the constitutional reasonableness of such search and seizure -- not the now-inapplicable knock and announce rule. In contrast, the majority asserts that "a breaking occurred when Officer Bermudes used force to prevent Harada from closing the door." Majority at 26; accord majority at 2. Therefore, the majority considers the door "shut" for purposes of the knock and announce statute; as a result, the requirements were invoked and the officers were required to declare their office, their business, and expressly demand entrance. See id. at 26. Thus, according to the majority, the fatal mistake occurred when Officer Bermudes prevented Harada from closing the door after Harada realized that officers were outside. Furthermore, because Officer Bermudes yelled, "Police. Search Warrant. Get on the ground," he failed to expressly state the required words, "we demand entry."
But the majority ignores this court's recent decision in State v. Eleneki, 92 Hawai`i 562, 993 P.2d 1191 (2000), recent federal case law, and the policy reasons underlying the knock and announce rule in favor of wholly irrelevant cases. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. I would vacate the circuit court's order granting Harada's motion to suppress.
I. HAWAII LAW
Hawai`i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 803-37 (1985) establishes the "knock and announce" requirements with respect to search warrants:
The officer charged with the warrant, if a house, store, or other building is designated as the place to b
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 Hawaii Employee Leasing Services
Employee Leasing Services
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|