State v. Harada2/25/2002
itations omitted) (brackets, ellipsis points, and footnote omitted).
In our state, absent exigent circumstances, the officers must afford the occupants of the premises "a reasonable time," id. at 468, 887 P.2d at 678, to respond to their announcement before making a forced entry. Otherwise, the "request for entry is meaningless." Quesnel, 79 Hawaii at 190, 900 P.2d at 187 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Hence, the point from which the occupants would know it was the police demanding entrance, as opposed to other persons, as measured from the time the police announced their office and business, is not a gauge of the privacy interest involved, but a standard governing police execution of a warrant. See id. at 191, 900 P.2d at 188.
B.
The second Dixon ground is an incongruous application of the words "voluntary surrender." In its ordinary sense, " he word ['voluntary'] . . . often implies knowledge of essential facts." Black's Law Dictionary at 1575. Voluntary also means "proceeding from the will or from one's own choice or consent." Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary at 1324. The mere opening of the door cannot be deemed voluntary in any fair sense because, as the facts in Dixon showed, the occupants were misinformed as to the reason for requesting entry. Under a ruse, the essential facts are hidden from the occupants, thus it cannot be said justly that they acted "from [their] own choice or consent." Id. (emphasis added). "Surrender" denotes "yield to the power, control, or possession of another upon compulsion or demand . . . or agree to forgo esp[ecially] in favor of another." Id. at 1186. Obviously, there cannot be a "true" surrender where the actor does not actually know what he or she has agreed to forego or to whom. Of course, it is arguable whether one who has either not completely opened the door, as the court found in this case, or attempts to close a partially opened door, can reasonably be said to have "voluntarily surrendered" his or her right to privacy.
C.
Any construction of article I, section 7, as was undertaken in Dixon, must be made in light of the fact that we have decidedit provides for greater protection from unreasonable searches and seizures than does the federal constitution, see State v. Mallan, 86 Hawaii 440, 448, 950 P.2d 178, 186 (1998) (stating that, "' s the ultimate judicial tribunal with final, unreviewable authority to interpret and enforce the Hawaii Constitution, we are free to give broader privacy protection than that given by the federal constitution,'" and that "unlike the federal constitution, our state constitution contains a specific provision expressly establishing the right to privacy as a constitutional right" (quoting State v. Kam, 69 Haw. 483, 491, 748 P.2d 372, 377 (1988))) (emphasis omitted); State v. Navas, 81 Hawaii 113, 123, 913 P.2d 39, 49 (1996) (explaining that article I, section 7 affords a "more extensive right of privacy" than that of the United States Constitution); State v. Lopez, 78 Hawaii 433, 445, 896 P.2d 889, 901 (1995) ("In the area of searches and seizures under article I, section 7, we have often exercised th freedom" to "provide broader protection under our state constitution."); State v. Enos, 68 Haw. 509, 511, 720 P.2d 1012, 1014 (1986); State v. Tanaka, 67 Haw. 658, 661-62, 701 P.2d 1274, 1276 (1985) ("In our view, article I, ยง 7 of the Hawaii Constitution recognizes an expectation of privacy beyond the parallel provisions in the Federal Bill of Rights.");State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 369-70 n.6, 520 P.2d 51, 58-59 n.6 (1974); State v. Hanson, 97 Hawaii 77, 82, 34 P.3d 7, 12 (App.), affirmed by, 97 Hawaii 71, 34 P.3d 1 (2001) ("The Hawaii Supreme Court has concl
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