State v. Harada2/25/2002
, the decisions have deviated from the true path established in the venerable 1869 statutes and strayed into the mire of fictional "breaking," Dixon, 83 Hawaii at 21, 924 P.2d at 189; "permissible ruse ," Eleneki, 92 Hawaii at 566, 993 P.2d at 1195; and partially opened doors, seeid. Sight of the objectives of HRS §§ 803-11 and 803-37 -- that they serve as a limitation on the conduct of police officers in executing warrants in order to effectuate the purposes discussed supra at 7-9, at the core of which is the policy favoring privacy -- is lost. For " ny official intrusion is necessarily an invasion of privacy, and the sanctity of the home is jealously guarded by the law." State v. Richardson, 80 Hawaii 1, 4, 904 P.2d 886, 889 (1995).
VII.
Thus, there are compelling reasons for overruling Dixon and Eleneki. The rules announced in those cases conflict with unambiguous statutory language and defy conceptual and practical workability. SeePlanned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992) (stating that "when th[e c]court reexamines a prior holding, . . . may ask whether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability") (citing Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116 (1965)); Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768, 783 (1992) ("In deciding whether to depart from a prior decision, one relevant consideration is . . . whether it is 'unworkable in practice.'" (Quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546, (1985).)).
Quite plainly, Dixon and Eleneki violated established rules of statutory construction. As mentioned, HRS §§ 803-11 and 803-37 are not ambiguous; therefore, they should have been applied according to their plain meaning. Seesupra pages 3, 15. HRS §§ 803-11 and 803-37 specifically set forth the manner in which arrest and search warrants are to be executed and on their faces do not admit of service in any other way, absent, as we have held, exigent circumstances. Seesupra pages 3-5, 14-15. The maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius applies, but was ignored in both Dixon and Eleneki. Seesupra pages 4-5. Rather than adhere to such rules of construction, Dixon and Eleneki looked to foreign statutes and precedent, setting this court on a wayward journey far from the prescriptions and historical underpinnings of our own statutes.
At their crux, Dixon and Eleneki contradict each other. Dixon held that a "ruse to effect voluntary opening of the door, through which the officers enter without any use of force . . . [is not] a breaking requiring compliance with the knock and announce requirements of HRS § 803-11." 83 Hawaii at 21, 924 P.2d at 189 (emphasis added). Eleneki held, in direct contradiction to Dixon that, in employing a ruse, "the officers were not required to knock and announce before entering and the force used by the officers to further open the door against [the occupant's] resistance was not a breaking" requiring the compliance with the knock and announce principles under HRS § 803-37. 92 Hawaii at 566-67, 993 P.2d at 1195-96 (emphasis added). If Dixon is a correct statement of the law, then Eleneki should be overruled. If Eleneki is a correct statement of the law, then Dixon should be overruled. It is not a question of "inadvertence" for they cannot in principle coexist. For the reasons I have espoused, neither, in my view, is a correct statement of the law, but evidence of the grave error in judicial statutory construction originating in Dixon and amplified in Eleneki.
Dixon and Eleneki subvert the language and purposes of HRS §§ 803-11 and 803-37. This can no longer be doubted. What was not considered in those cases,
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