State v. Harada2/25/2002
ounce rule. We also hold that the prosecution failed to properly preserve the issue whether there were exigent circumstances at the time the warrant was executed that excused the officers' compliance with HRS § 803-37. Consequently, the issue has been waived.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order granting the defendants' motion to suppress.
OPINION OF ACOBA, J., CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the force of the Crown. It may be frail -- its roof may shake -- the wind may blow through it -- the storm may enter, the rain may enter -- but the King of England cannot enter -- all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement! Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 378-79 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting 15 Hansard, Parliamentary History of England (1753-1765), at 1307), overruled in part byCamara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
The sanctity of one's abode has been embedded in our common law traditions even before the origins of our nation. SeePayton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980) (citation omitted). Protection for that sanctity is embodied in 1869 statutes now denominated as Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) §§ 803-37 and 803-11 (1993). The majority departs from express mandates of those statutes. Therefore, I respectfully disagree with the import and reasoning of the majority opinion, and for the reasons stated, would affirm the order of the first circuit court (the court) granting suppression of the evidence, but on the ground that use of a ruse is not permitted under the express language and underlying policies of those statutes.
I.
A.
The relevant statute in this case, HRS § 803-37, states:
Power of officer serving. The officer charged with the warrant, if a house, store, or other building is designated as the place to be searched, may enter it without demanding permission if the officer finds it open. If the doors are shut the officer must declare the officer's office and the officer's business, and demand entrance. If the doors, gates, or other bars to the entrance are not immediately opened, the officer may break them. When entered, the officer may demand that any other part of the house, or any closet, or other closed place in which the officer has reason to believe the property is concealed, may be opened for the officer's inspection, and if refused the officer may break them. (Emphasis added.)
"In interpreting statutes, the fundamental starting point is the language of the statute itself and where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, our sole duty is to give effect to its plain and obvious meaning." State v. Kalama, 94 Hawaii 60, 64, 8 P.3d 1224, 1228 (2000) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In this case, " one of the parties contend and [it can]not discern that the language of HRS § [803-37] is ambiguous inasmuch as, on its face, there is no 'doubt, doubleness of meaning, or indistinctiveness or uncertainty of an expression.'" Id. (quoting Citizens for Protection of North Kohala Coastline v. County of Hawaii, 91 Hawaii 94, 107, 979 P.2d 1120, 1133 (1999) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Thus, we must interpret HRS § 803-37, by "giv effect to the legislature's intent, which is obtained primarily from the language of the statute[.]" Dines v. Pacific Ins. Co., 78 Hawaii 325, 332, 893 P.2d 176, 183 (1995) (internal quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted). Cf.Kalama, 94 Hawaii at 65, 8 P.3d at 1229 ("It is how the statute would be read by the layperson [that] guides our construction in criminal cases.
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