 |
|
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Larijani v. Georgetown University2/7/2002 12, 818 (D.C. 1998) (quoting Drejza v. Vaccaro, 650 A.2d 1308, 1312 n.10 (D.C. 1994)). "If that standard means what it says, then the conduct alleged must truly be extraordinary to hold a defendant accountable for this tort." Carey v. Edgewood Mgmt. Corp., 754 A.2d 951, 956 (D.C. 2000). And to survive a Rule 12 (b)(6) motion, "the allegations of the complaint must afford a basis for concluding that [the plaintiff] may be able to prove conduct of the required enormity." Id. (emphasis deleted). In Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Breeden, 665 A.2d 929 (D.C. 1995), a claim was upheld where it was alleged and shown that the landlord's agent "repeatedly `accidentally' dropped" or "brandished" a pistol in tenants' presence as part of systematic efforts to make them quit their apartments. Id. at 935. Now, evidently by extension, allegations that noise makers were beamed at an employee with similar intent to make her quit her job are considered enough to state a claim of conduct beyond all civilized norms. Sometimes common sense - or a sense for the ridiculous - should be enough for the court to say "no."
Never mind that no reason is alleged why supervisor Blumenthal wanted plaintiff to leave, or that no other conduct besides installation of the noise makers made up the alleged "course of conduct" aimed at that result. And never mind that plaintiff does not allege she was denied permission or unable to move her work station farther away from the noise, and thus somehow held captive to it. See Duncan v. Children's Nat'l Med. Ctr., 702 A.2d 207, 211 (D.C. 1997) (dismissal upheld where complaint did not allege employer "force[d employee] to remain in a situation where she would be exposed to radiation"). On the off-chance that the noise makers might have had the torturous capacity attributed to them - emitting a "loud, static-sounding, piercing" but at the same time "humming and droning" noise - and that Blumenthal might have used them as the instrument of a malicious purpose, the suit is allowed to go forward.
When applied to this intentional tort, with its proof requirements as severe as any in our law, Rule 12 (b)(6) serves an important gatekeeping function which the majority disregards. Whether or not plaintiff could have alleged a case of negligent infliction of emotional distress, see Williams v. Baker, 572 A.2d 1062 (D.C. 1990) (en banc), it cheapens the currency of the tort she alleged to let this action proceed.
Page 1 2 3 4 District of Columbia Employee Leasing Services
Employee Leasing Services
|
|
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|