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Larijani v. Georgetown University2/7/2002
ost nine months, knowing that she had become seriously ill as a result, then a reasonable juror could surely find that the defendants had deliberately set out to torment Ms. Larijani, and that they had kept up this cruel treatment for a very long time. If this is truly what happened - if, however skeptical one may be of the veracity of the plaintiff's claims, one treats them as true for purposes of a Rule 12 (b)(6) motion - then surely Ms. Larijani has satisfied the standards set forth in our cases.
Judges are supposed to use their common sense, and a disinterested reader might well raise an eyebrow and wonder whether Ms. Larijani's characterizations of her acoustical plight may be at least a little exaggerated. If, as the defendants seem to suggest, the devices were similar to the "hushers" in our trial courtrooms, then the mountain of which Ms. Larijani complains might, after all, be little more than a molehill. But the complaint in this case was dismissed on the basis of Ms. Larijani's pleading alone, and neither the trial judge nor the appellate court has seen the devices in question or heard the purported acoustical torture which they are alleged to have inflicted. If the case had proceeded to trial, then the jury could have decided, perhaps with very little difficulty, whether this was an actionable case of deliberate torment by the defendants or a meritless series of exaggerations by a plaintiff who perceived persecution when none was present. Treating Ms. Larijani's allegations as true, however, as we must for purposes of the motion to dismiss, we do not see how anyone who has not heard the noise made by the devices in question can make an informed evaluation of Ms. Larijani's claim of outrage. In our view, a reasonable person would indeed exclaim "Outrageous!" if the noise was as unbearable as the plaintiff claimed; if, as a result, her health suffered as badly as she alleged; and if the defendants, knowingly and callously, did absolutely nothing about it.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Reid, Associate Judge, concurring
I view this as a very, very close case. Ms. Larijani's complaint is quite "thin" regarding the elements of an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The matter comes to us, however, on a Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12 (b)(6) motion to dismiss. Given the legal principles that govern our review of the denial of such motions, as identified by Judge Schwelb, I am compelled to agree that, in essence, Ms. Larijani's complaint is minimally sufficient to survive the motion to dismiss.
Farrell, Associate Judge, dissenting
The majority seems to agree, though I am not sure, that if the foot-length "noise makers" in this case were the conventional sort of "husher" or "white noise" maker employed in most courtrooms of the Superior Court, this suit would be meritless. But apparently because the devices might have been of a different, diabolical sort capable of inflicting "acoustical torture" over time - maybe a relic from Kafka's penal colony - the suit is allowed to go forward. Although Rule 12 (b)(6) permits liberal pleading, I do not believe it is so loose a sieve as to let pass this example - one might say this parody - of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
That tort, as the majority purports to recognize, demands allegations of "conduct so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Homan v. Goyal, 711 A.2d 8
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