 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Larijani v. Georgetown University2/7/2002
14)
The relentless noise emanating from the two noise makers continued to bombard the plaintiff every day, all day long until September 1998. (Id., 15)
The complaint thus fairly alleges that the "loud" and "piercing" noise made by these devices throughout the working day for a period of nine months was unbearable for Ms. Larijani, that it had serious deleterious effects upon the plaintiff's health, that the defendants were made aware of Ms. Larijani's physical and emotional injuries and of their cause, and that the defendants refused to take any corrective action.
The motions judge dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In the judge's view, "no juror could reasonably find that the daily use of annoying sound screen devices rises to the level of being so outrageous that it exceeds the boundaries of conduct usually tolerated by a decent society." These timely appeals followed.
II.
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted only where "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of claim which would entitle to relief." Owens v. Tiber Island Condo. Ass'n, 373 A.2d 890, 893 (D.C. 1977) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). For purposes of a Rule 12 (b)(6) motion, "the complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and its allegations taken as true." McBryde v. Amoco Oil Co., 404 A.2d 200, 202 (D.C. 1979) (per curiam); see also Abdullah v. Roach, 668 A.2d 801, 804 (D.C. 1995). The sufficiency vel non of the complaint raises a question of law, and we therefore owe no deference to the trial court and review the order of dismissal de novo. Abdullah, supra, 668 A.2d at 804. Taking Ms. Larijani's allegations as true, and construing the complaint in the light most favorable to her, we cannot agree that Ms. Larijani would have been precluded from recovery under any state of facts which could have been proved in support of her claim. See McBryde, supra, 404 A.2d at 202.
To establish a prima facie case of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must show (1) extreme and outrageous conduct on the part of the defendant which (2) either intentionally or recklessly (3) causes the plaintiff severe emotional distress. Howard Univ. v. Best, 484 A.2d 958, 985 (D.C. 1984) (quoting Sere v. Group Hospitalization, Inc., 443 A.2d 33, 37 (D.C. 1982)). The conduct must be "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Homan v. Goyal, 711 A.2d 812, 818 (D.C. 1998) (quoting Drejza v. Vaccaro, 650 A.2d 1308, 1312 n.10 (D.C. 1994)). In general, "a case of intentional infliction of emotional distress is made out only if the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim "Outrageous!" Homan, supra, 711 A.2d at 818 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts ยง 46 (1965)). The question before us is whether an impartial jury could reasonably find that the defendants' conduct, as described by the plaintiff, and with all reasonable inferences drawn in the plaintiff's favor, was sufficiently outrageous to satisfy this concededly demanding standard.
We are constrained to answer this question in the affirmative. If the allegations of the complaint are true - if the noise made by the contraptions in question was indeed as loud, piercing, and unbearable as Ms. Larijani claims - and if the defendants continued to subject Ms. Larijani to these conditions for alm
Page 1 2 3 4 District of Columbia Employee Leasing Services
Employee Leasing Services
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|