Hughes v. Home Savings of America2/13/2002
der all of the evidence introduced at trial, none of the conduct on which plaintiff relies consists of: racial epithets or slurs; racially derogatory comments; physical harassment motivated by race; racially derogatory posters; cartoons or drawings; or similar racially motivated conduct directed at plaintiff. In short, there is no substantial evidence or reasonable inferences therefrom in support of the jury's racial harassment finding. Therefore, the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for a JNOV as to plaintiff's racial harassment claim.
C. Racial Discrimination
Plaintiff sought to recover for racial discrimination on a disparate treatment theory as opposed to disparate impact. As the California Supreme Court explained in Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354, footnote 20: "`Disparate treatment' is intentional discrimination against one or more persons on prohibited grounds. (E.g., Teamsters v. United States (1977) 431 U.S. 324, 335-336, fn. 15 ; Mixon [v. Fair Employment and Housing Com. (1987)] 192 Cal.App.3d 1306, 1317.)" The California Supreme Court also recognizes unlawful discrimination may be proven by means of evidence of disparate impact. In Guz, the court held: "` isparate impact' [means] that regardless of motive, a facially neutral employer practice or policy, bearing no manifest relationship to job requirements, in fact had a disproportionate adverse effect on members of the protected class. (E.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971) 401 U.S. 424, 431 ; City and County of San Francisco v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 976, 985-986 .)" (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 354, fn. 20, original italics.) As the United States Supreme Court has explained: "`Disparate treatment' . . . is the most easily understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex or national origin. . . ." (Teamsters v. United States, supra, 431 U.S. at pp. 335-336, fn. 15; Caldwell v. Paramount Unified School Dist. (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 189, 195-196.) As we explained in Caldwell v. Paramount Unified School Dist., supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at pages 195-196: "In order to prevail under the disparate treatment theory, an employee must show that the employer harbored a discriminatory intent. In most cases, however, the plaintiff will be unable to produce direct evidence of the employer's intent, but will instead have to rely on circumstantial evidence and the inferences that may be drawn therefrom. . . ."
To achieve a fair resolution of the intentional discrimination question, the California courts have adopted the three-part burden-shifting test established by the United States Supreme Court. (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc., supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 354; Caldwell v. Paramount Unified School Dist., supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at pp. 195-196.) The burden-shifting analysis provides a framework for pretrial resolution of discrimination claims, as by demurrer or motion for summary judgment, non-suit, or directed verdict. (Caldwell v. Paramount Unified School Dist., supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at pp. 201-204; Muzquiz v. City of Emeryville (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1117-1118.) Once a discrimination case is submitted to a jury, however, the shifting burdens construct "`drops from the case.'" (Caldwell v. Paramount Unified School Dist., supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 204; Muzquiz v. City of Emeryville, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1117-1118; Begnal v. Canfield & Associates, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 66, 73; accord, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks (1993) 509 U.S. 502, 511; see Wegner et al., Cal. Prac. Guide: Civ. Trials & Evid. (The Rutter Group 2000) Ch. 8F
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