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San Joaquin County v. Perano2/1/2002
arbitration was and remained submitted at the four-year six-month date of June 8, 2000. (Ibid.) It remained submitted until the court withdrew it on August 21, 2000 -- for two and a half months after the start of the tolling period. (Ibid.) The five-year period prescribed by section 583.310 extended two and one-half months after December 8, 2000. The court's January 23, 2001 order dismissing the action was premature.
The Peranos urge us to affirm the court's order based upon the contention a discretionary dismissal would be appropriate in this case. (§ 583.410.) On this anemic record, we are unable to make any determination about this contention. We decline to express any opinion on this potential ground for dismissal.
B. Equitable Estoppel
Because we will remand this matter, we address San Joaquin's further argument of equitable estoppel. San Joaquin argues the Peranos may not rely on the five-year statute because the Peranos lulled San Joaquin into a false sense of security regarding the five-year statute. We reject this argument.
San Joaquin cites Borglund v. Bombardier, Ltd. (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 276. In that case, the appellant alleged respondents' counsel told appellant's counsel (a) the five-year statute was not applicable, and (b) he would not seek a motion to dismiss if the case progressed beyond the five-year anniversary of the filing of the complaint. (Id. at p. 278.) Further, appellant's counsel "alleged numerous actions by respondents after the statutory period that evidenced an intention to proceed to trial in spite of the running of the five-year statute." (Ibid., italics added.) The trial court believed that equitable estoppel could not be used as a defense to the five-year statute. (Id. at p. 279.) Division Two of the First Appellate District reversed and remanded the case for a hearing on the question of estoppel. (Id. at p. 282.) The court stated, "If a trial court encounters statements or conduct by a defendant which lulls the plaintiff into a false sense of security resulting in inaction, and there is reasonable reliance, estoppel must be available to prevent defendant from profiting from his deception." (Id. at p. 281.) "The determination of whether a defendant's conduct is sufficient to invoke the doctrine is a factual question entrusted to the trial court's discretion." (Cuadros v. Superior Court (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 671, 675.)
Here, San Joaquin points to the actions of the Peranos' counsel indicating the Peranos were amenable to mediation up to and including November 2000, their agreement to the multiple extensions of the mediation date, and their representations to the court they were prepared to participate in mediation. These actions, however, do not rise to conduct that lulled San Joaquin into a false sense of security. San Joaquin does not cite any affirmative statements by the Peranos that they would forego reliance on the five-year statute; they do not contend the Peranos engaged in conduct inconsistent with their ultimate assertion of the five-year statute after the fifth-year anniversary. The Peranos' continued participation in the litigation and their agreements to continue the mediation dates, without more, does not constitute conduct upon which a claim of equitable estoppel may be based. In short, San Joaquin was not reasonable in relying on these facts as indicators the Peranos would not assert the five-year statute as a defense.
It was incumbent on San Joaquin to keep track of the five-year statute, not the Peranos. It was incumbent on San Joaquin to push this matter to conclusion because it was the plaintiff. (See § 583.130.) If San Joaquin sought to continue the trial date beyond the five-year anniver
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