 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Palmer v. GTE California Incorporated1/30/2002
y mail while the defendants in Dodge personally served notice of entry so that section 664.5 did not "come into play." (Dodge, at pp. 520, 521-522.)
2. Conclusion
We conclude that Palmer's service of a file-stamped copy of the judgment was written notice of entry of judgment under sections 659 and 660 so as to commence the 15-day period for any party to move for a new trial or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and the 60-day period for the court to rule on the motions, GTE's motions for new trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict were untimely, the court had no jurisdiction to rule on the motions, and the order granting the motions is void.
Our construction of sections 659 and 660 is consistent with Tri-County Elevator Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 135 Cal.App.3d 271, Ramirez v. Moran, supra, 201 Cal.App.3d 431, and Dodge v. Superior Court, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th 513, and inconsistent with the alternative holding in People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. Cherry Highland Properties, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th 257 and dicta in Van Beurden Ins. Services, Inc. v. Customized Worldwide Weather Ins. Agency, Inc., supra, 15 Cal.4th 51. We agree that a file-stamped copy of the judgment in a county where judgments are entered upon filing (§ 668.5) provides unequivocal notice that judgment was entered and constitutes written notice of entry of judgment under sections 659 and 660. (Van Beurden, at p. 57, fn. 2 [§ 660]; Dodge, at pp. 518-519 [§ 660]; Tri-County, at p. 276 [§ 659].) We also agree with the opinions holding that the 15-day period for a party to move for a new trial and the 60-day period for a court to rule on a new trial motion commence upon a party's service of written notice of entry of judgment, and that section 664.5, subdivision (a) does not govern the requirements for a party's notice of entry of judgment under sections 659 and 660 (Dodge, at pp. 519-520, 522 [§ 660]; Tri-County, at pp. 275-276 [§ 659]; see Ramirez, at p. 436 [§ 659]), and we respectfully disagree with the alternative holding (Cherry Highland, at pp. 261, 263) and dicta (Van Beurden, at p. 65) stating otherwise.
An opinion by the Court of Appeal holding on point cannot be overruled by dictum in a Supreme Court opinion. (Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274, 287.) Dictum by the Supreme Court may be persuasive, but it is not binding. (County of San Bernardino v. Superior Court (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 378, 388; Grange Debris Box & Wrecking Co. v. Superior Court (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1349, 1358; Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1265, 1272.)
3. GTE's Arguments
GTE argues that section 664.5 is "all-inclusive," establishes mandatory requirements for all notices of entry of judgment, and therefore governs the validity of notice of entry for purposes of sections 659 and 660. Apart from the other reasons for our conclusion to the contrary stated ante, we again note that section 664.5, subdivision (a) does not govern notice of entry of judgment by "any party" or in all circumstances. It applies only to the party submitting an order or judgment for entry and does not apply to a party who serves notice of entry but did not submit an order or judgment for entry. (§ 664.5, subd. (a).) Sections 659 and 660, in contrast, refer to notice of entry by "any party." The limited scope of notices of entry governed by section 664.5, subdivision (a) compared with the wider range of notices of entry referenced in sections 659 and 660 argues against an inference that the Legislature intended the requirements of section 664.5, subdivision (a) to govern the validity of notice of entry under sections 659 and 660. Moreover, we will not presume tha
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 California Employee Leasing Services
Employee Leasing Services
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|