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Palmer v. GTE California Incorporated1/30/2002
ust 1999.
Palmer filed a notice of appeal from the order granting a new trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict and from the judgment on July 1, 1999. GTE filed a notice of appeal from the judgment and the order denying in part the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on July 22.
CONTENTIONS
Palmer contends (1) her service on GTE of a file-stamped copy of the judgment was "written notice of entry of judgment" under sections 659 and 660 so as to commence the 15-day period for any party to move for a new trial or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and the 60-day period for the court to rule on the motions, GTE's motions filed more than 15 days later therefore were untimely, and the court had no jurisdiction to grant the motions; (2) substantial evidence supports the verdict as to harassment, so GTE is not entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict on that count; (3) the court erred in granting a new trial on her counts for harassment and false imprisonment; and (4) the court erred in granting a non-suit as to punitive damages.
GTE contends (1) Palmer's service of a file-stamped copy of the judgment did not comply with section 664.5 and therefore was not "written notice of entry of judgment" under sections 659 and 660, so the motions for a new trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict were timely; and (2) in any event, there is no substantial evidence to support the verdict on either count.
DISCUSSION
1. GTE's Posttrial Motions Were Untimely
a. Construction of Sections 659 and 660
Palmer's first contention turns on the construction of sections 659 and 660. We review de novo the construction of a statute and its application to undisputed facts. (Burden v. Snowden (1992) 2 Cal.4th 556, 562; Kurtz v. Calvo (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 191, 193.) Our objective is to ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent. (§ 1859; Burden, at p. 562.) We begin with the statutory language and interpret its plain meaning. (California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd. of Rialto Unified School Dist. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 627, 632; Burden, at p. 562.) We cannot insert qualifying language where it is not stated or rewrite the statute to conform to a presumed intention that is not expressed. (§ 1858; California Teachers Assn., at p. 633; California Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1995) 11 Cal.4th 342, 349.) Rather, we must assume that the Legislature would have included qualifying language if it so intended, particularly where the Legislature included similar qualifying language in related provisions but omitted it in the provision being construed. (California Fed. Savings & Loan Assn., at p. 349.)
A party moving for a new trial must file a notice of intention to move for a new trial either before the entry of judgment or by the earliest of three dates: (1) 15 days after "mailing notice of entry of judgment by the clerk of the court pursuant to Section 664.5"; (2) 15 days after "service upon him by any party of written notice of entry of judgment"; or (3) "180 days after the entry of judgment." (§ 659, italics added.) The same time limits apply to a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. (§ 629) The time to file a motion for new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict cannot be extended by order of the court or by stipulation of the parties. (§ 659.)
The trial court must decide the motions within a certain time period, or else it loses the power to rule on the motions and they are denied by operation of law. The time to rule on the motions is within 60 days after the earlier of "mailing of notice of entry of judgment by the clerk of the court
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