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Palmer v. GTE California Incorporated1/30/2002
ect our conclusion that service of a file-stamped copy of the judgment constitutes "written notice of entry of judgment" for purposes of sections 659 and 660.
Finally, we reject GTE's argument that Palmer's service of a document entitled "notice of entry of judgment" on March 9, 1999, estops her from asserting that her earlier service of a conformed copy of the judgment was effective. The time limits of sections 659 and 660 are jurisdictional, and a court has no authority to excuse them based on a party's conduct. (Fong Chuck v. Chin Po Foon (1947) 29 Cal.2d 552, 554; Tabor v. Superior Court (1946) 28 Cal.2d 505, 507-508; Meskell v. Culver City Unified School Dist. (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 815, 825.)
The result of our holding and the prior opinions consistent with our holding is that in the absence of a filed proof of service of notice of entry of judgment, it is incumbent upon the party moving for a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict to inform the court of the date of service of notice of entry of judgment and the time limit for the court to rule on the motion and to ensure that the court is aware of the time limit. If the moving party served with written notice showing unequivocally that judgment was entered bears this responsibility, neither the parties nor the court will be uncertain as to the jurisdictional time limits to move and rule on the posttrial motions.
2. Palmer's Appeal from the Judgment Was Untimely and GTE's Was Timely
Service and filing of a "valid" notice of intention to move for a new trial or "valid" notices of intention to move for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict extends the time to appeal from the judgment and from the denial of judgment notwithstanding the verdict to 30 days after entry of the order denying the motions or denial of the motions by operation of law. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3(a), (d).) A "valid" notice of intention to move for a new trial or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict must be timely. (Ramirez v. Moran, supra, 201 Cal.App.3d at p. 437.)
GTE's motions for new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict were not timely, as discussed ante, and therefore were not "valid" and did not extend the time to appeal from the judgment. Palmer's notice of appeal from the judgment filed on July 1, 1999, was untimely because it was filed more than 60 days after her service of notice of entry of judgment on February 26. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2(a).)
GTE's appeal from the judgment and from the order denying judgment notwithstanding the verdict was timely, however. If a party timely appeals an order granting a motion for new trial, any other party may appeal from the judgment or from an order denying judgment notwithstanding the verdict within 20 days after the clerk mails notice of the initial appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3(c).) GTE's notice of appeal filed on July 22, 1999, was timely because it was filed within 20 days after the clerk mailed notice of Palmer's appeal from the order granting a new trial.
3. GTE Is Not Entitled to Reversal of the Judgment
1. Standard of Review
An appellant challenging a verdict by the trier of fact must show that there is no substantial evidence to support the verdict. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, accept as true all evidence tending to support the verdict and all reasonable inferences from the evidence, and resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the verdict. (Crawford v. Southern Pacific Co. (1935) 3 Cal.2d 427, 429.) We reverse the judgment only if the evidence viewed in this light and on the entire record does not support the ve
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