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Palmer v. GTE California Incorporated1/30/2002
t the Legislature intended the anomaly that would result if section 664.5, subdivision (a) governed the validity under sections 659 and 660 of notice of entry by some parties but not others, absent a statutory expression of such an intent.
GTE argues that the trial court should be informed when the jurisdictional time to rule on posttrial motions will run, and that compliance with section 664.5, subdivision (a), including filing the original notice of entry and proof of service, would ensure that the court is aware of the time limits. This is a policy argument and does not compel us to so construe sections 659 and 660. Although a court must construe a statute to avoid an absurd result that the Legislature did not intend (Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102, 113), it is not absurd for the trial court to rely on the party moving for a new trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict to inform it of the time to rule on the motions. Moreover, the court's reliance on the moving party in this manner is not inconsistent with the court's reliance on the moving party generally in ordering a new trial, in that the court cannot grant a new trial on its own motion (Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of America (1985) 38 Cal.3d 892, 899) and cannot grant a new trial on a ground not specified in the moving papers (Malkasian v. Irwin (1964) 61 Cal.2d 738, 745; Wagner v. Singleton (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 69, 72).
GTE also argues that the requirements of section 664.5, subdivision (a) that a party submitting an order or judgment for entry must "prepare and mail a copy of the notice of entry" and file "the original notice of entry" with the court imply that notice of entry of judgment must be given in a document separate from a file-stamped copy of the judgment. This argument assumes that sections 659 and 660 incorporate the requirements of section 664.5, subdivision (a), as GTE acknowledges. Since we conclude that sections 659 and 660 do not incorporate the requirements of section 664.5, subdivision (a) and that noncompliance with section 664.5, subdivision (a) does not vitiate notice of entry under sections 659 and 660, we need not decide whether section 664.5, subdivision (a) requires notice of entry to be given in a separate document.
GTE argues further that rule 2(a) of the California Rules of Court indicates that "notice of entry of judgment" means "a document entitled `notice of entry' of judgment" and that a file-stamped copy of the judgment ordinarily is not notice of entry of judgment. GTE maintains that the absence of an express provision allowing a file-stamped copy of the judgment to serve as notice of entry under section 659 and 660, as expressly provided in rule 2(a), indicates that service of a file-stamped copy of the judgment does not constitute notice of entry for purposes of sections 659 and 660. We disagree. Rule 2(a) refers to "a document entitled `notice of entry' of judgment," making it clear that notice of entry must be given in a separate document for purposes of rule 2(a) and that if not for the express exception in rule 2(a) allowing service of a file-stamped copy of the judgment in lieu of a document entitled "notice of entry," service of a file-stamped copy of the judgment would not suffice for purposes of rule 2(a). Sections 659 and 660, in contrast, do not require "a document entitled `notice of entry' of judgment," but require only "written notice of entry of judgment" (§ 659) or "written notice of the entry of the judgment" (§ 660), and do not incorporate the requirements of rule 2(a). The absence of an express provision in sections 659 and 660 allowing service of a file-stamped copy of the judgment does not limit the meaning of "written notice of entry of judgment" or aff
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