 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Lara v. Buckley Boradcasting Corporation of Monterey1/30/2002
ory cause of action independently of a showing she had actually suffered harassment and discrimination as a result of Buckley's failure to take reasonable steps to prevent it. (Trujillo v. North County Transit Dist., supra, 63 Cal.App.4th 280.)
The plaintiffs in Trujillo brought an action against their employer on several statutory (FEHA) and common law tort theories alleging employment discrimination based on race. The jury returned special verdicts finding the employer had not engaged in any discriminatory conduct, had not inflicted severe emotional distress, and had not committed slander. However, the jury also found the employer had violated Government Code section 12940, subdivision (i) by failing to take all reasonable steps to prevent discrimination. On this basis, the jury awarded the plaintiffs both compensatory and punitive damages. The trial court granted the employer's motion for JNOV, and the plaintiffs appealed. The appellate court affirmed the judgment for the employer.
The issue in Trujillo was whether an employee who has suffered no discrimination may nonetheless maintain an action against his or her employer for violating Government Code section 12940, subdivision (i). Put another way, is the employee damaged in some way by the violation other than by suffering discrimination? The court answered in the negative.
"The commonsense approach used by the trial court has great intuitive appeal: ` here's no logic that says an employee who has not been discriminated against can sue an employer for not preventing discrimination that didn't happen, for not having a policy to prevent discrimination when no discrimination occurred ....' Employers should not be held liable to employees for failure to take necessary steps to prevent such conduct, except where the actions took place and were not prevented. Plaintiffs have not shown this duty was owed to them, under these circumstances. Also, there is a significant question of how there could be legal causation of any damages (either compensatory or punitive) from such a statutory violation, where the only jury finding was the failure to prevent actionable harassment or discrimination, which, however, did not occur." (Trujillo v. North County Transit Dist., supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 289.)
Thus, the only sort of damages Lara could have suffered as a result of Buckley's statutory violation alleged in the first cause of action was sexual harassment, the same as was alleged in the fourth cause of action. The jury's finding on the one hand that Lara was not sexually harassed is incompatible with its finding on the other hand that she was. The trial court should therefore have granted Buckley's motion for a new trial. (Lambert v. General Motors, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th 1179 [special verdicts finding automobile was negligently but not defectively designed were fatally inconsistent].)
Given our conclusion, we do not address the other grounds upon which Buckley claims it was entitled to a new trial. Appeal by Sharon Clemons (F034194)
Clemons disputes only the trial court's denial of her claim for costs. In the court's written "RULING ON MOTIONS," it stated:
"It is determined that plaintiff [Lara] is the prevailing party and the cost bill of Sharon Clemons is stricken as all the costs incurred were incurred on behalf of Buckley Broadcasting Corporation who was represented by the same counsel as Defendant Clemons from the time the initial answer was filed."
Clemons challenges the court's ruling in two respects: First, she contends she was the prevailing party on the second cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the only cause of action to which
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 California Employee Leasing Services
Employee Leasing Services
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|