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Lara v. Buckley Boradcasting Corporation of Monterey1/30/2002
, and we would be justified under the circumstances to reject them summarily. (Goldring v. Goldring (1949) 94 Cal.App.2d 643, 645.) Suffice it to say the evidence is sufficient to show Lara suffered emotional distress prior to her termination, along with assorted physical complaints she attributed to the stress caused by the sexual harassment she encountered at work. She testified, for example, she sometimes broke out in a rash, her shoulders and neck hurt, she had headaches, she felt really tired, she had trouble sleeping, and her hair fell out. Evidence of this symptomatology provides "`some guarantee of genuineness.'" (Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 930.)
It is true Lara did not seek either medical care or therapy for these problems prior to her termination. However, two weeks after she was fired Lara went to see a marriage and family therapist, Beverly Anderson, for the first of what would be about 25 visits over the next 14 months. Thus, Anderson testified it was losing her job that finally caused Lara to go into counseling, in that it added financial and personal pressures to those that had previously existed at her work. But nothing in Anderson's testimony can be construed reasonably to say that Lara had suffered no emotional distress prior to her termination. Consequently, Buckley seriously misrepresents the record when it asserts the evidence "confirmed that the only proximate cause ... of emotional distress to LARA came as a result of her termination."
Buckley also asserts, again quite incorrectly, that Lara's medical records "prove" her physical problems were not attributable to stress caused by the sexual harassment she encountered at KSEQ. There is some evidence Lara had suffered emotional problems in the past, which had manifested themselves in similar sorts of ways. And certainly Buckley attempted to persuade the jury that Lara's physical complaints were the product of some pre-existing emotional instability. But for Buckley to characterize its self-serving interpretation of the evidence as established fact, while ignoring everything else that would support a different conclusion, borders on sanctionable misconduct.
3. Motion for New Trial
Buckley contends it was entitled to a new trial (Code Civ. Proc., ยง 657) on four grounds: First, the jury's award of damages on the fourth cause of action for negligent training and supervision was inconsistent with its finding on the first cause of action that Lara suffered no injury as a result of sexual harassment. Second, the process by which the jury determined its damages award, as revealed by the jurors' posttrial declarations, constituted misconduct. Third, Lara's counsel committed numerous acts of misconduct during the trial and in his closing arguments to the jury. Fourth, certain irregularities in the way the court received the jury's verdict exacerbated the first three problems. We agree with the first contention and therefore do not reach the remaining three.
Inconsistent Verdicts
Inconsistent special verdicts "must be harmonized if there is any `possibility of reconciliation under any possible application of the evidence and instructions. If any conclusions could be drawn thereunder which would explain the apparent conflict, the jury will be deemed to have drawn them.' [Citation.]" (Lambert v. General Motors (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1183.) Short of that, inconsistent verdicts are "`against the law,'" and the appropriate remedy is a new trial. (Shaw v. Hughes Aircraft Co. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1344.) A trial court is accorded wide discretion in ruling on a motion for new trial, and its exercise of that discretion will be given great deferen
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