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Lara v. Buckley Boradcasting Corporation of Monterey1/30/2002
ions, or events occurring, either within or without the jury room, of such a character as is likely to have influenced the verdict improperly. No evidence is admissible to show the effect of such statement, conduct, condition, or event upon a juror either in influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or concerning the mental processes by which it was determined."
Thus, a jury's verdict may be impeached with proof of overt acts of misconduct, objectively ascertainable and subject to corroboration, but not with proof of the jurors' subjective reasoning process. (Province v. Center for Women's Health & Family Birth (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1673, 1678.)
Here the declarations purport to describe what the jurors as a group "felt," "believed," "figured," or "wanted" during their deliberations on damages, rather than to quote any statements or describe any overt acts by individual jurors. The declarations suggest at most "`deliberative error' in the jury's collective mental process--confusion, misunderstanding, and misinterpretation of the law." (Ford v. Bennacka (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 330, 336.) The court was therefore correct to exclude them. (Ibid., Maxwell v. Powers (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1596, 1604-1605.)
2. Motion for JNOV
Buckley maintains it was entitled to JNOV (Code Civ. Proc., ยง 629) on the cause of action for negligent training and supervision for three reasons: First, it argues the evidence establishes as a matter of law that Lara's emotional distress was entirely the result of her termination, which the jury determined was not retaliatory as alleged in the second cause of action. This is another way of saying there is no substantial evidence to show that Buckley's negligent training and supervision caused Lara to suffer any compensable injury. Second, Buckley claims the jury's award of non-economic damages for negligent training and supervision is inconsistent with its finding Lara suffered no injury as a result of the hostile work environment it found to exist in connection with the first cause of action. Buckley reasons the negligent training and supervision simply created the hostile work environment, which in turn caused Lara no injury. Third, Buckley contends the evidence fails to substantiate Lara's claim of emotional distress, such as by showing she also suffered some accompanying physical symptoms. (See Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1980) 27 Cal.3d 916, 930 [in a claim for the negligent infliction of emotional distress, circumstances of the case must provide some guarantee the injury is genuine].)
As we will explain, the appropriate remedy when special verdicts are found to be irreconcilably inconsistent is a new trial, not a JNOV. Consequently, we will address the second of Buckley's contentions in the next part of this opinion. Buckley's first and third contentions raise questions of substantial evidence.
We review a JNOV using the same standard the trial court applied in ruling on the motion: we must determine whether the record, viewed most favorably to the prevailing party, contains any substantial evidence to support the verdict. (Trujillo v. North County Transit Dist. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 280, 284.)
Buckley provides us with no assistance in this regard. The "Statement of Facts" in its opening brief is neither factual nor accurate, but instead consists primarily of argument supported by assertions and conclusions drawn very selectively from the evidence. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 13 [appellant's opening brief must contain an accurate statement of the facts].) We are not required to sift through the record of a 21-day trial in order to evaluate Buckley's substantial evidence claims
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