Romley v. Arpaio2/19/2002
ples of construction as are used in construing statutes. State v. Baca, 187 Ariz. 61, 63, 926 P.2d 528, 530 (App. 1996). Thus, to determine the Board's intent in adopting Rule 10.07, we look first to its language, Calmat of Ariz. v. State ex rel. Miller, 176 Ariz. 190, 193, 859 P.2d 1323, 1326 (1993), and we will ascribe plain meaning to its terms unless they are ambiguous. Rineer v. Leonardo, 194 Ariz. 45, 46, 7, 977 P.2d 767, 768 (1999). If the rule is ambiguous, we will employ principles of construction. Byers-Watts, 199 Ariz. at 469, 10, 18 P.3d at 1268. Moreover, we are not limited to considering the parties' arguments in construing the rule. Evenstad v. State, 178 Ariz. 578, 582, 875 P.2d 811, 815 (App. 1993) (" hen we are considering the interpretation and application of statutes, we do not believe we can be limited to the arguments made by the parties if that would cause us to reach an incorrect result.").
The Commission did not define the term "parties" in its procedural rules. Consequently, we use the ordinary meaning of the word as found in a well-respected dictionary. Snyder v. Tucson Police Pub. Safety Pers. Ret. Sys. Bd., 201 Ariz. 137, 140, 12, 32 P.3d 420, 423 (App. 2001). Black's Law Dictionary 1144 (7th ed. 1999) defines a "party," in significant part, as " ne by or against whom a lawsuit is brought." Consequently, the reference to "parties" in Rule 10.07 may refer to both parties to an appeal, as the Sheriff contends. Conversely, the term may apply only to employees, particularly because the sentence immediately preceding the one at issue describes an option limited to employees. See Rule 10.07 ("Hearings shall be closed to the public, unless the appellant requests an open hearing."). As we next explain, when considering the term in the context of the entire rule, the practical effect of the Sheriff's proposed interpretation, and the Board's related acts, we decide that the word refers only to employees.
First, review of the entire rule reveals that the Commission authorizes a different "choice" to parties than the one championed by the Sheriff. The Sheriff focuses our attention on the language in Rule 10.07 that provides that " arties may . . . be represented by legal counsel . . . of their choosing." But when the ellipses are replaced with words, we discover that the "choice" granted by the rule to the "parties" is to either represent themselves, or secure representation by a lay person or legal counsel. See id. ("Parties may represent themselves or be represented by legal counsel, or a lay representative, of their choosing."). By placing the words "of their choosing" at the end of the list of alternatives, we conclude that the Commission and the Board, by ratification, intended to communicate that the "parties" could select any one of three forms of representation.
Second, in light of the "choice" offered by Rule 10.07, if we interpret "parties" as including county officials, the Rule would be rendered unconstitutional because it would impermissibly grant to those officials the right to choose lay representation. As previously explained, see supra 13, the supreme court is constitutionally empowered to exclusively decide who can engage in the practice of law. Although that court permits employees to utilize lay representation in Commission appeals, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 31(a)(4)(B), it does not grant the same right to employers, including county officials. Because we strive to avoid an interpretation that would render a rule unconstitutional, Hayes v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 178 Ariz. 264, 272, 872 P.2d 668, 676 (1994), we decide that the term "parties" in Rule 10.07 refers only to employees.
Third, our examination of the Board's creation of the
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