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Romley v. Arpaio2/19/2002 61, 1166-67 (1988), and does not have the luxury of shedding professional accountability at whim. Thus, for example, the supreme court has disciplined an attorney for "slip-shod and sloppy accounting practices," even though the conduct occurred while the attorney worked in an administrative, government job. In re Grimble, 157 Ariz. 448, 452-53, 759 P.2d 594, 598-99 (1988); see also In re Lurie, 113 Ariz. 95, 97-98, 546 P.2d 1126, 1128-29 (1976) ("We state at the outset that it makes no difference whether [the lawyer] was acting as an attorney or as a businessman. There is nothing to prevent an attorney from engaging in business or other activities, but when he does so he does not abandon his professional ethics if he wishes to remain a member of his profession.").
We find the reasoning in the supreme court's disciplinary cases persuasive in resolving the issue before us. If a licensed attorney represents an agency in an administrative hearing, the supreme court's interest in ensuring qualified representation can be satisfied, regardless of that person's employment title. We therefore decide that the County's designation of Lebowitz as an administrative employee does not alter the fact that he would function as a licensed attorney in representing the Sheriff before the Commission. Thus, if the Sheriff's office is authorized to select its own attorney to represent it in Commission appeals, Lebowitz can lawfully fulfill that role. We now address that issue.
II. The Sheriff's authority to select counsel
The Sheriff recognizes that he lacks statutory authority to choose or employ counsel to represent him in Commission appeals. See A.R.S. ยง 11-532(A)(9) ("The county attorney is the public prosecutor of the county and shall: . . . ct as the legal advisor to the board of supervisors, attend its meetings and oppose claims against the county which the county attorney deems unjust or illegal."). He argues, however, that the Board of Supervisors possesses such power, and it delegated this authority to him and other county officials by ratifying Commission procedural rules, including Rule 10.07. The County Attorney does not contest that the Board has authority to hire independent counsel to represent the Board or county officials and agencies in litigation matters. See Bd. of Supervisors v. Woodall, 120 Ariz. 379, 383, 586 P.2d 628, 632 (1978) (holding Board may not hire independent counsel for purposes of obtaining legal advice if County Attorney available to provide counsel, but can engage independent counsel for purpose of prosecuting and defending legal actions to which county is a party). He asserts, however, that the Board did not delegate this authority to county agencies, including the Sheriff's office, by ratifying the Commission's adoption of Rule 10.07. Thus, our resolution of this appeal turns on the meaning of Rule 10.07.
Rule 10.07 provides that " arties may represent themselves or be represented by legal counsel, or a lay representative, of their choosing." The Sheriff contends that this rule means that any party to a Commission appeal, including the agency official named in the appeal, may choose legal counsel. The County Attorney responds that the intent of Rule 10.07 is unclear, and that the Sheriff's proposed construction would conflict with the Board's express delegation to the County Attorney to obtain legal services as described in the Maricopa County Procurement Code. Thus, the County Attorney argues, we should reject the Sheriff's contention and decide that the Board has not delegated to county officials its discretionary authority to engage independent counsel for Commission appeals.
In interpreting Rule 10.07, we apply the same princi
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