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Mejia v. Industrial Commission of Arizona2/12/2002
en claimant's condition becomes stationary). Vested property rights are no less so merely because they may be altered by future events, as the supreme court recognized in San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 193 Ar iz. 195, 972 P.2d 179 (1999). There, the court acknowledged that " he Legislature may certainly enact laws that apply to rights vested before the date of the statute" but stated that such laws "may only change the legal consequences of future events." Id. at . In this regard, Mejia's vested temporary benefits are substantively no different from the vested permanent benefits in Aranda. Even though permanent, the workers' benefits were likewise subject to alteration by future events, such as a change in physical condition, see A.R. S. § 23-1044(F)(1), or a reduction or increase in earning capacity. See § 23-1044(F)(2) and (3).
But in Aranda, the cour t noted that it was "not dealing . . . with future events" because both workers had committed their offenses before the effective date of § 23-1031. 198 Ariz. 467, 28, 11 P.3d 1006, 28. The court thus held that the statute did not apply to the workers, even though one of them was not incarcerated until after the statute's effective date. The court reasoned:
[Workers' compensation] claimants must have the opportunity to avert the loss of benefits. T he last moment this would be possible, in the context of conviction and incarceration, is the date of the criminal offense. That is the last moment that claimants may choose to alter their behavior to avoid the application of section 23-1031. Id. Based on this rationale, we likewise conclude that § 23-1031 does not apply to Mejia. His criminal conviction occurred in 1993, well before the statute's effective date of December 1, 1997, and, like one of the workers in Aranda, Mejia's incarceration occurr ed after that date, following the revocation of his probation in 1998.
Although some might argue that the last moment Mejia could have altered his behavior to avert the loss of benefits would have been the date of the event giving rise to the probation revocation, we find this argument ignores the express language of § 23-1031(A). The statute authorizes the suspension of benefits only when a claimant has been "convicted of a crime and is incarcerated. " We believe this language unequivocally links the incarcer ation to the criminal conviction itself, r ather than a future probation violation, and also conforms to the well-established rule that, in revoking probation, a trial court " must impose a sentence because of the original offense." State v. Rowe, 116 Ar iz. 283, 284, 569 P.2d 225, 226 (1977). See also State v. Herrera, 121 Ariz. 12, 588 P.2d 305 (1978) (punishment for revocation of probation is not for probationary breach but for original charge); State v. Baum, 182 Ar iz. 138, 893 P. 2d 1301 (App. 1995) (trial court er roneously punished defendant for probation violation, not crime).
For the foregoing reasons, we set aside the award affirming the suspension of Mejia's temporary total disability compensation benefits during his incarceration.
WILLIAM E. DRUKE, Judge
CONCURRING:
PHILIP G. ESPINOSA, Chief Judge
JOSEPH W. HOWARD, Presiding Judge
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