Mejia v. Industrial Commission of Arizona2/12/2002
lve this issue, the court looked to the following definitions for vested, expectant, and contingent rights:
"Rights are vested . . . when the right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become the property of some particular person or persons as a present interest. They are expectant, when they depend upon the continued existence of the present condition of things until the happening of some future event. They are contingent, when they are only to come into existence on an event or condition which may not happen or be performed until some other event may prevent their vesting. " Steinfeld v. Nielsen, 15 Ar iz. 424, 465, 139 P. 879, 895 (1913), quoting Pearsall v. Great N. Ry. Co., 161 U. S. 646, 673, 16 S. Ct. 705, 713, 40 L. Ed. 838, 847 (1896).
Based on these definitions, the Aranda court found that both workers' awards had vested because the awards left "nothing to contingency or to some future event," 198 Ariz. 467, 21, 11 P.3d 1006, , and thus the workers "possessed an existing, enforceable right, in property, to receive the monthly compensation payments." Id. at . Vesting occurred, said the court, "upon finalization of the award," and the record showed that both awards had become final before the effective date of § 23-1031. Id. at .
Here, however, respondents argue that Mejia's award did not vest because, unlike the permanent compensation in Aranda, his " temporary compensation is merely an expectation." We disagree. As noted above, an expectant right depends on the continuation of present conditions until some future event happens. Steinfeld. For example, a person named as a devisee in a will has only an expectant right in the testator's estate because the testator may modify or revoke the will before his or her death. Thus, any right the person may have in the estate depends on continuing to be named as a devisee until death occurs. See In re Estate of Finlay, 424 N.W. 2d 272 (Mich. 1988) (potential heirs and legatees have mere expectancy interest until testator's death).
On the other hand, a right vests " when every event has occurred which needs to occur to make the implementation of the right a certainty. " Aranda, 198 Ar iz. 467, , 11 P. 3d 1006, . That is the case here. Although Mejia initially may have had an expectant right to workers' compensation benefits after his on-the-job injury, once he was awarded temporary total compensation benefits and the award became final, his right to those benefits vested.
Where every necessary event has occurred making implementation of the right a certainty, then the right to receive a workers' compensation benefit constitutes a substantive vested property right. This means that when final, the award creates an immediate right to present enjoyment of benefits in the current month, as well as future enjoyment in subsequent months. Such rights are neither contingent nor merely expectant. Aranda, 198 Ariz. 467, 20, 11 P.3d 1006, .
Moreover, if those benefits are withheld or reduced, "the claimant may exercise an existing, legal right to enforce compliance with the award by direct action against the carrier for payment and, if relevant, bad faith." Id. at . Accordingly, we conclude that Mejia had a vested property right in the temporary total compensation benefits awarded to him when the award became final in 1996, which was prior to the effective date of § 23-1031.
Our conclusion is unaffected by the possibility that Mejia's temporary benefits may be terminated if his condition becomes stationary. See Jessie's Boat Shop & R.V. Repair v. Industrial Comm'n, 155 Ariz. 380, 746 P. 2d 1310 (App. 1987) (entitlement to temporary disability benefits terminates wh
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