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Mejia v. Industrial Commission of Arizona2/12/2002
AWARD SET ASIDE
In this statutory special action, petitioner Jose Mejia challenges the administrative law judge's (ALJ) award that A. R. S. § 23-1031 suspended Mejia's right to receive temporary total disability compensation benefits while he was incarcerated. Based on Aranda v. Industrial Commission, 198 Ariz. 467, 11 P.3d 1006 (2000), and the r ecord before us, we set aside the award.
We view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the ALJ's award. Rent A Center v. Industrial Comm'n, 191 Ariz. 406, 956 P. 2d 533 (App. 1998). In May 1995, Mejia injured the big toe on his right foot while wor king for respondent Sletten Construction Company and, due to resulting complications, had to have the toe amputated. The following May, he was awarded both medical and temporary total disability compensation benefits from the date of injury " until such time as his condition becomes stationary." It appear s that none of the parties sought special action review of the award pursuant to A.R.S. § 23-951 and, thus, the award became final. Standard Brands Paint Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 26 Ar iz. App. 365, 548 P.2d 1177 (1976). In 1998, while still receiving benefits, Mejia's probation from a 1993 felony conviction was revoked, and he was incarcerated from June 30, 1998, thr ough October 22, 1999. Shortly after he was incarcerated, respondent State Compensation Fund notified Mejia that because of his incarceration, his temporary total disability compensation benefits were temporarily suspended pursuant to § 23-1031.
Mejia filed a notice of pr otest under A.R. S. § 23-1061(J) and, after a hearing, the ALJ entered an award affirming the suspension. Citing Aranda, the ALJ found that Mejia did not have a vested right to the temporary total disability compensation benefits, reasoning that " ny entitlement to such benefits is merely expectant with no right to benefits in future months and contingent on medical status and employment status." The ALJ affirmed the award on administrative review, and Mejia sought special action relief in this court.
Mejia contends the ALJ erred in retroactively applying § 23-1031 to him because he "was on total temporary disability benefits before the enactment of the statute." Because the interpretation and application of a statute presents a question of law, our review is de novo. Schwarz v. City of Glendale, 190 Ar iz. 508, 950 P. 2d 167 (App. 1997).
The relevant portion of § 23-1031(A) provides that "beginning on December 1, 1997, payment of compensation under this chapter shall be suspended during the period of time that [a claimant] has . . . een convicted of a crime and is incarcerated in any state, federal, county or city jail or corr ectional facility." In Aranda, our supreme court addressed whether § 23-1031 applied retroactively to two injured workers who had been awarded permanent partial disability benefits and were later incarcer ated for crimes they had committed before the statute's effective date. Although the court decided that the statute was substantive, rather than procedural, because it "functions substantively to redefine, regulate, or even eliminate a claimant's legal authorization to receive benefits, " 198 Ariz. 467, , 11 P. 3d 1006, 15, the cour t recognized that even "a substantive legal right may be subject to retroactive impairment before it becomes a vested right. " Id. at . See Hall v. A. N.R. Freight Sys., Inc., 149 Ar iz. 130, 717 P. 2d 434 (1986) (substantive right may be impaired before it vests). The court thus had to determine whether the two workers had vested rights, rather than expectant or contingent rights, to their permanent partial disability benefits. To reso
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